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ABSTRACT

Prior research has found equity theory explains employee responses to falling wages in relation
to other comparable workers. The present research attempts to contribute to the criminal justice
literature by directly testing equity theory within the policing context, something no study has
done to date. Applied to policing, equity theory predicts sworn officers employed by
departments with falling or inequitable salaries (i.e., their salaries fail to keep up with those at
other regional agencies) will reduce their work input (i.e., discretionary arrests) and/or quit in
higher numbers than before (i.e., increase attrition). The present study also attempts to quantify
how far officer salaries can fall behind the mean regional police pay before a municipal agency
experiences negative outcomes. The research questions are examined using data from Criminal
Justice Agency Profile (CJAP) Reports from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
(FDLE), with historical salary and attrition data for 122 municipal law enforcement agencies in
Florida from 2001-2011, and Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Part II Arrest Data from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for the same time period. A time-series cross-sectional
(TSCS) analysis is conducted over 11 annual data points. This study attempts to bring an
additional theory into the fold of the policing literature by testing it against a large, law
enforcement specific data set. This is in part an effort to answer the call for what has been
described as a need for more theory in the criminal justice and policing literature (Cooper &
Worrall, 2012; Mears, 2010). It should also enable police administrators to gauge, relative to
regional competitor salaries, at what point to anticipate negative consequences from the
underpaid condition of police officers working at their municipal police agencies. The findings
iii

suggest Florida municipal police officers do not reduce their work inputs, as measured by UCR
Part II arrests, but do quit their jobs in larger numbers in response to stagnant or falling salaries
as predicted by equity theory. Policy implications include a better understanding by police
administrators as to what they can expect and prepare for when municipal police officers’
salaries become stagnant or fall as compared to pay at other regional law enforcement agencies.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Study Problem
As the United States experiences a time of tight and sometimes shrinking budgets, tough
financial decisions will need to be made to balance government budgets. The federal
government continues to carry an annual budget deficit and the national debt keeps growing
(Montgomery, 2013). While the country’s economy overall is beginning to show signs it is
emerging from the recession that began in 2008, state and local governments, like the federal
government, continue to experience budget shortfalls. In many cases they have hidden structural
problems, such as hefty pension obligations, that are likely to continue to pressure their budgets
(Lyman & Williams Walsh, 2014).
These budget pressures are likely to require tough budget decisions to befall municipal
police forces, particularly a lack of pay raises and in some cases, pay cuts and terminations. The
mayor, city manager, police commissioner, police chief or other police administrator must guess
the consequences of holding stagnant or cutting back police salaries. He or she can make more
informed budget decisions if research has quantified the results of police officers’ salaries falling
behind salaries of their regional counterparts. Therefore, it becomes valuable to not only
distinguish the degree to which the stagnation of officers’ salaries has a real measurable effect
but also to identify the threshold for which the lack of pay increases yields significant negative
consequences for the city and police agency.
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Equity theory provides an opportunity to understand the consequences of salary inequity.
This theory has been extensively tested in the industrial and organizational psychology literature,
but not in the policing context. The empirical findings document the effect of the theory to be
“generally quite strong,” particularly for explaining the responses of underpaid or under
rewarded workers (Greenberg, 1990b, p. 401). Equity theory explains why underpaid workers
tend to quit (Valenzi & Andrews, 1971) and/or do less work (Pritchard, Dunnette, & Gorgenson,
1972) in response to inequitable salaries. This application of equity theory drives both of the
current study’s working hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional
municipal police agencies leads to decreased work input.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional
municipal police agencies leads to increased attrition.
Findings from the current study should enable police managers to quantify how, if at all,
wages falling behind regional counterparts affect their agency. The study may find, for example,
that wages can fall slightly below the regional average without engendering negative effects, but
a substantial gap of more than one standard deviation from the mean has consequences for the
agency. Police managers may gain better insight into how to fight or counter the ill-effects of
falling wages with alternative means to make the job more satisfying and bring equity back into
balance. Additionally, the findings may incentivize police managers to offer competitive starting
salaries to solicit increased effort and performance from officers.
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Study Methodology
This is a quasi-experimental study consisting of a time-series cross-sectional analysis
(TSCS) using data from Florida municipal police agencies from 2001-2011. Police agencies are
the unit of analysis. It is important to note that while many of the variables in this study could be
applied to an individual analysis, this study is focused on the outcomes experienced by municipal
police agencies. Differences in outcomes are compared among agencies. Salary and attrition
data are gathered from the Criminal Justice Agency Profile (CJAP) Reports for municipal law
enforcement agencies in Florida from 2001-2011 to generate the variables. Work input, as
measured by the largely discretionary arrests of Part II crimes, are gathered from the FBI
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Reports from 2001-2011. Regional police recruiting areas will
be defined by the geographic boundaries of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) for given
municipality.
Significance of the Study
The present study benefits from the use of longitudinal data that consists of municipal
law enforcement agencies, of varying size, within each MSA in Florida over the course of 11
years to examine police officer responses to wages falling below regional averages. It also
benefits from the application of equity theory, a theoretically deficient area in policing.
Researchers such as Mastrofski (2004) have called for more theory in policing. The present study
attempts, in part, to respond to such calls by testing a well-established theory in a policing
context to determine if it is useful in explaining police officers’ responses to their changing
organizational environment. This analysis also provides an opportunity to test equity theory over
time, which has been noted as generally lacking (Mitchell & James, 2001) in the otherwise
3

robust body of research (Cosier & Dalton, 1983; Vecchio, 1982). As an added benefit, police
chiefs should be able to gain insight into resource allocation decisions, particularly as it relates to
officer salaries.
Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 1 discusses the need for municipal police managers to have a better and more
empirically-driven understanding of when to be concerned about stagnant or falling officer
salaries and what to expect as a result. In addition, the first chapter includes the purpose of the
study, an explanation of the research methodology (TSCS with a large data set), and a discussion
of the contribution of the study to the existent policing literature.
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework of the study. This chapter provides an
overview of equity theory and its origins, as well as the empirical research of the responses to
both the underpayment and overpayment conditions in an exchange relationship. The chapter
also discusses police officer work product and the extent of the longitudinally testing of equity
theory. A review of the literature pertinent to equity theory in criminal justice research, officer
pay and police organizational research is also presented.
Chapter 3 consists of the independent and dependent variables, the choice of a
longitudinal design for the study, the study research questions and hypothesis. It also provides a
discussion of the research design, unit of analysis, and the data sets used for the study. Further, a
description of the variables is presented and the choice of TSCS is explained and supported.
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Chapter 4 reports the descriptive analysis of the data and detailed explanations of the
steps employed to analyze the data. The results of the TSCS analysis and the related statistical
techniques utilized are also presented and discussed.
Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the study.
Police management implications are discussed as well as recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO: EQUITY THEORY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Overview
According to equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965), fairness or balance is desired by
individuals in an exchange relationship. The exchange relationship consists of inputs and
outcomes. Inputs are defined as “the participant’s contributions to the exchange, which are seen
(by a scrutineer) as entitling him to reward or cost” and outcomes are defined as, “the positive
and negative consequences that a scrutineer perceives a participant has received in the course of
his relationship with another” (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978, pp. 11-12). In an
employee-to-employer relationship, the employee’s inputs typically include his or her level of
education, applicable training, advanced skills, intelligence, experience and on the job work
effort (Adams, 1965, pp. 276-277). Employee inputs occasionally include arguably less rational
or sometimes unspoken contributions such as attractiveness or good health (Adams, 1965, p.
277). Positive outcomes in an employee-to-employer relationship typically include, “pay,
rewards intrinsic to the job, satisfying supervision, seniority benefits, fringe benefits, job status
and status symbols, and a variety of formally and informally sanctioned prerequisites, such as the
right of a higher-status person to park his car in a privileged location” while negative outcomes
include, “poor working conditions, monotony, [and] fate uncertainty” (Adams, 1965, p. 278).
Equity theory explains why participants in an exchange relationship, such as an
employee-to-employer relationship, believe their individual contributions should be reflected
with rewards of equal value in return (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1974; Walster et al., 1978). In an
employee-to-employer relationship, employees evaluate the fairness of their exchange with the
6

employer by comparing what they contribute - their inputs such as work effort, skill set and
education - to their outcomes such as pay, status and privileges, to co-workers or other
comparable workers outside the company (Cowherd & Levine, 1992). For example, employee A
has a strong work ethic, advanced professional certificates and a master’s degree. If employee A
notices a colleague in a comparable position at an outside employer who has a poor work ethic,
fewer advanced technical certificates, no graduate degree and earns an equal or higher salary,
employee A naturally feels undercompensated. This sense of under compensation, or the
antithesis of overcompensation, is referred to as inequity in an exchange relationship according
to equity theory. Equity theory predicts the presence of this situation in an exchange relationship
will lead to a reaction by one or both parties to reestablish balance in the relationship. As
described by Cowherd and Levine (1992, p. 303):
When individuals perceive that their ratio of inputs to outcomes is similar to that of their
comparative referents, they feel that equity exists. Dissimilar ratios lead to perceptions of
inequity. People attempt to reduce the distress caused by inequity in three ways. First,
individuals may change their perceptions of either their own or their reference group's
inputs and outcomes. Second, individuals can alter their actual inputs (e.g., decrease their
work effort) or outcomes (e.g., get a pay raise). Finally, individuals can end inequitable
relationships by leaving their organizations.
When an employee in an exchange relationship experiences inequity, or feels his or her inputs do
not equal his or her outcomes, he or she will experience a tension state and take steps to reestablish balance in the relationship and relieve the tension or end the relationship.
Equity theory is important to organizational psychology as it was the first general theory
to attempt to integrate many “mini-theories” of social behavior (Berkowitz & Walster, 1976).
While “mini-theories” with lots of exceptions and limitations can be difficult to remember and
confusing for the practitioner to apply, a general theory with broad brushstrokes allows
7

researchers to provide simple, practical advice that is easy to apply. Although it was intended for
application to all types of exchange relationships, Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity theory has
historically found the most attention from social scientists in its application to organizational
settings, particularly the relationship between employees and their employers (Greenberg,
1990b).
Origins
The earliest roots of equity theory can be traced to Aristotle who described the
importance, “…to divide the distributive honor or reward into parts which are to one another as
the merits of the persons who are to participate" (Ross, 1966, p. 1131). Its more modern history
can be found in Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance which specifies when inequity
arises and the options a person has available to respond. Homans (1961, 1974) argues equity is
based on an expectation he refers to as “the rule of distributive justice” and argues that
expectation is learned from experience. The rule is satisfied when “the ratio of the measures of
the persons is equal to the ratio of the measures of their respective rewards” or, in other words, if
two people are equal they should receive equal awards (Homans, 1974, p. 249).
Blau (1964) agreed with Homans’ distributive justice definition, but he disagrees about
how justice originates. He argues that justice is derived from a social norm of “fairness” which
requires justice as a matter of moral principle (Blau, 1964). Adams (1963, 1965) expands
Homans’(1961) social concepts to focus on employer-to-employee exchange relationships. He
also focuses on reasons for, and responses to, a lack of equity to a greater extent than Blau
(1964).
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Walster et al. (1978) consolidated the work of distributive justice and identified how
equity theory could be applied to different types of settings. They did this to provide a general
outline of a new theory (Cohen & Greenberg, 1982). Walster et al.’s (1978, p. 2) equity theory
integrates portions of exchange theory, reinforcement theory, psychoanalytic theory, and
cognitive consistency theory. Equity theory is composed of four parsimonious propositions as
described by Walster et al. (1978, p. 6), including:
PROPOSITION I: Individuals will try to maximize their outcomes (where outcomes
equal rewards minus costs).
PROPOSITION IIA: Groups can maximize collective reward by evolving accepted
systems for equitably apportioning resources among members. Thus, groups will evolve
such systems of equity, and will attempt to induce members to accept and adhere to these
systems. PROPOSITION IIB: Groups will generally reward members who treat others
equitably, and generally punish (increase the costs for) members who treat others
inequitably.
PROPOSITION III: When individuals find themselves participating in inequitable
relationships, they will become distressed. The more inequitable the relationship, the
more distress individuals will feel.
PROPOSITION IV: Individuals who discover they are in an inequitable relationship will
attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity. The greater the inequity that exists,
the more distress they will feel, and the harder they will try to restore equity.
Responses to Inequity
According to Walster et al. (1978), equity theory explains the following: When a worker
feels his or her inputs are not equal to his or her outcomes, the worker perceives the inequity and
attempts to correct it. Inequity in pay causes workers distress. In response, workers have two
general categories of coping strategies available to them: restore either actual equity or
“psychological equity” (Walster et al., 1978, p. 119). Actual equity consists of things one can
9

see or measure in an exchange such as items produced, quality of work, employee theft, attrition,
etc. Psychological equity is the personal view of the net equity or inequity of a relationship. One
example is an employee who reevaluates their feelings of equity internally and thinks to oneself
that the outcomes or net compensation he or she is getting equates to a fair deal, even though
nothing has actually changed.
Actual equity responses by workers differ for piece workers (i.e., workers paid per item
produced or service rendered and not specifically for time spent working) versus workers paid on
an hourly or salary basis. Underpaid workers who are compensated on an hourly or salary basis
tend to restore actual equity by producing a lower quality work product and less of it (Adams &
Rosenbaum, 1962). This type of effort is anticipated by equity theory as a response to stagnant
or falling wages. This may not be a sufficient test of equity theory as not all workers respond in
this way under all conditions. Some researchers have critiqued Adams’ work after finding only
partial or no support for restoration of equity by an employee lowering his or her work
production in experiments (Walster et al., 1978, p. 128). Restoration of equity by doing less
work is not the only response to pay inequity. Valenzi and Andrews (1971) replicated overpaid
and underpaid conditions and found no signs of actual equity restoration through changes in
work production but did find 27% of those they underpaid quit while none of those they overpaid
quit.
The distinction between actual and psychological responses to inequality is important in
equity theory as it provides an explanation for employees who do not appear to outwardly
respond to being overpaid or underpaid. A psychological equity response is essentially a
10

participant’s re-evaluation of the exchange relationship which brings the employee to the
conclusion the interaction he or she originally thought was unfair may actually be fair. This idea,
proposed by Vroom (1964), is explained as a more practical response by overpaid workers over
time. After initial efforts to create equity by manipulating actual equity, these workers would
likely find such efforts far more tiring than simply re-framing their view of the situation and
coming to agreement with their employers that they deserve their high pay.
Empirical Tests of Equity Theory
Equity theory predicts human responses to an inequality of outcomes condition in an
exchange relationship. This inequality can manifest itself in one of two directions:
underpayment or overpayment. The overpayment condition has been tested more extensively
than the underpayment condition. This may be in part due to the opinion of some reviewers, and
perhaps some researchers, that the predicted responses for the underpayment condition of equity
theory are obvious while the predicted responses for the overpayment condition are not (Akerlof
& Yellen, 1990; Goodman & Friedman, 1971). The anticipated underpayment responses of
equity theory have been tested with research generally finding support for the theory in this
condition (Adams & Freedman, 1976, p. 47).
Attrition in Response to Underpayment
Empirical testing of equity theory of workers in the employment field has generally
found inequitably treated employees are at higher risk for attrition. For example, in an hourly
wage test of pay inequity by Valenzi and Andrews (1971, p. 1), thirty one college students who
were searching for work were hired for short term, part-time clerical work and paid an hourly
11

wage. All of the participants indicated the pay was fair for the job when they started. However,
after the first work session, the employees were divided into three groups, an underpaid group,
an overpaid group and a control group whose pay remained the same. Each of the employees
was told about the unequal pay scale for the exact same work task as the other employees to
explicitly highlight the pay inequity. Participants were informed that the pay inequity was not
due to their individual performance as a worker, but rather as a result of a random selection to
meet an arbitrary budgeting requirement which was out of the employer’s control. While there
was no measured change in the employees work product, 27% of those in the underpaid
condition quit the job while the groups of the other two pay conditions suffered no attrition at all.
This study lends support to the idea that employees in an inequitable pay condition may suffer
greater rates of attrition.
In another example, Finn and Lee (1972) administered a questionnaire to Federal Public
Health Service non-supervisory, professional employees measuring work history, perception of
job inputs, salary, and job-related attitudes. The immediate supervisors of the participating
employees also completed a separate, supervisor specific questionnaire. Using a multipleregression model, the results showed inequitably treated study employees were found to be more
likely to quit their job than equitably treated study employees.
In a study of 117 undergraduate students, the participants were assigned to a proofreading
task where they had an anticipated pay scale based on prior experience for participation in the
university’s psychological experiments (Austin & Walster, 1974). The researchers then
manipulated the pay for three groups into underpaid, equitably paid and overpaid conditions.
12

Consistent with equity theory, equitably paid employees were the most content while underpaid
employees were the most distressed. In summary, there is empirical support for predictions
based on equity theory. Specifically, underpayment by employers leads to employee distress and
increased attrition.
Reduced Work Input in Response to Underpayment
Research has shown that underpayment in an exchange relationship is, “largely in accord
with [equity] theory,” and efforts to reduce those inequities to include doing less work (Adams &
Freedman, 1976, p. 47). In an underpayment experiment, Lawler and O'Gara (1967) hired 40
college students for a short term interview task. Half were paid an equitable rate for each
interview conducted while the other half were severely underpaid at approximately 60% less.
The results found the underpaid employees conducted more interviews, but of measurably lower
quality than those employees who were paid the equitable rate. The same has been found to be
true for hourly paid workers as well.
The underpaid employee condition has also been tested in studies that also include other
employees in the overpaid condition being evaluated simultaneously within the same experiment.
In a study of 96 university students given tasks to complete for piecework pay, the participants
were divided into three pay scales of underpaid, equitably paid and overpaid. As predicted by
equity theory the underpaid employees produced a lower quality work product and attempted to
compensate for their underpaid status by producing a higher quantity of product (Andrews,
1967). In another study involving 64 college students divided into three pay groups, hourly
wages were paid in the underpaid, equitably paid and overpaid conditions. The classification of
13

the three pay categories was based on ability after testing. Underpaid employees consistently
produced lower quality work then their equitably paid counterparts as supported by equity theory
(Evan & Simmons, 1969).
Leventhal and Bergman (1969) split payment for a work task between two workers who
equally contributed to the task and then purposely manipulated inequity in the payment for the
job. They found a worker’s level of concern about his or her underpayment was greatest when
his or her portion of the payment received was between 15-30% of the job’s total payment
instead of an equitable split between two people of 50% each. An interesting discovery also
found in the study was that a minority of the workers who received 14% or less total
compensation split two ways with an equally contributing coworker, shunned a small token of
upward adjustment to their pay.
Employing 120 undergraduate students, Kahn (1972) employed the participants to work
at individual proofreading tasks. Although they each had their own assignments, the student
employees were told their work was graded together and they were given one payment for their
collective effort. This left the students to determine how to divide up the pay amongst them.
Students were placed in underpaid, equitably paid and overpaid conditions through the use of
bogus performance reports of each employee’s work product for each assignment. Equity theory
was supported by the results of the study as employees in the overpaid condition, with poor
performance reports on their work efforts, agreed to take a smaller share of the group payment.
At the same time employees in the underpaid condition, with excellent performance reports on
their work efforts, agreed to take a greater amount. However, those in the overpaid condition did
14

not give up enough pay to properly reflect their contributions and those in the underpaid
condition did not agree to a larger amount that properly reflected their efforts accordingly. This
indicated that when working directly with another person, there may be some inherent desire to
equally distribute pay regardless of actual contributions.
In an experiment, 253 college students were hired to work on a clerical task for half a day
for seven consecutive days, with half the days paid for through hourly compensation. The
underpaid and overpaid conditions were manipulated by telling participants who applied for the
job that there was a misprint in the employment advertisement, either above or below the
advertise wage. A simple clerical task of identifying and circling select prices on a computer
printout created a situation where the quality of the work product was either 100% correct or
incorrect. With hourly employees in the underpaid condition, a marked decrease in employee
performance was observed. Additionally employees in the underpaid condition also reported
feeling less satisfied than employees in the equitably paid condition (Pritchard et al., 1972).
Garland (1973) also found support for equity theory when piece rate work was distributed
to underpaid, equitably paid and overpaid groups. The underpaid workers produced lower
quality and more quantity in an effort to increase their take home pay. The results in the
underpaid condition were found to be true for both male and female employees; however they
differed in the overpaid condition with males increasing the quality of their work product over
those equitably paid. Meanwhile, overpaid females produced approximately the same quality
work product as those equitably paid. Once again, in the underpaid condition, empirical research
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generally supports equity theory’s prediction that workers will do less and lower quality work in
an effort to create equity in their exchange relationship with their employer.
Testing of Overpayment
Lawler, Koplin, Young, and Fadem (1968) tested overpayment during three separate
work sessions spread out over six days by hiring temporary workers to conduct interviews. They
calculated the quality of work, quantity of work, and captured the views of the employees via a
questionnaire each work day. The researchers followed the same practice of Adams and
Rosenbaum (1962) to manipulate the apparent wage discrepancy between the temporary
workers. Some employees were given the impression they were receiving wages equal to their
peers while others were given the impression they were being overpaid. As predicted by equity
theory, overpaid employees attempted to offset their inequitable pay on the first day by
producing a work product quality that was well above their equitably paid counterparts, but by
the second and third day the quality fell to a comparable level while their questionnaires
reflected a change in attitude, a psychological change, with a greater belief they were actually
deserving of their higher pay (Lawler et al., 1968). This study demonstrated support for a very
short life cycle of equity theory’s predicted overpayment response.
Goodman and Friedman (1968) hired 73 male undergraduate students to work as shortterm research coders to test the overpayment condition predicted by equity theory. In the hourly
overpayment condition, the researchers found support for equity theory as overpaid workers
produced greater quantity of work product than did equitably paid workers. Additionally, after
the researchers verbally introduced a known manufacturing rate to the workers, production
16

variance was minimized. This attempt by the employees to more closely match their work
performance, as it related to their pay condition to the known production rate, provided
additional evidence of over performance by the overpaid workers.
In an example of the mixed empirical support for equity theory in the overpayment
condition, Evans and Molinari (1970) found a lack of support for equity theory’s predicted
overpayment response after manipulating the job security situation of employees. The
researchers hired 32 people for the study, 11 of whom were students, for short-term, part-time
work conducting interviews. Under conditions in which an employee was made to feel his or her
job security was at stake, workers in both the underpaid and the overpaid condition responded
with high quality-low quantity work, a response predicted by equity theory only for overpaid
piece rate workers (Evans & Molinari, 1970, p. 113). This study has been viewed as evidence
that early studies, such as Lawler et al. (1968), did not find support for equity theory in the
overpayment condition. Many of these studies were likely measuring lowered self-esteem and
not inequity as intended when these types of studies told participants they were under qualified
(and therefore overpaid) as opposed to being actually under qualified (Carrell & Dittrich, 1978,
p. 204).
In a study testing equity theory in the overpayment condition, Deci (1972) found support
for equity theory. Testing 96 undergraduates, the subjects were asked to solve a series of puzzles
and were left alone for eight minutes before they were asked to formally begin work. The
subjects were divided into three groups; one group received no compensation, one received
payment after the work period for each puzzle completed and one received payment in advance
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for an overly optimistic anticipation of puzzles likely to be completed prior to the eight minute
wait period and the formally assigned work period. As predicted, the students paid in advance
for work not yet done responded to the overpaid condition by spending the most time working on
the puzzles by utilizing the eight minute waiting period to get their puzzle solving started early.
Pritchard et al. (1972) also found support for equity theory’s predicted response to the
overpayment condition. In their study of 253 undergraduate student employees hired for short
term clerical work, overpaid workers returned higher worker performance than their underpaid
co-workers. The overpaid employees also reported being less satisfied than their equitably paid
counterparts, as predicted by equity theory.
Schmitt and Marwell (1972) attempted to test some of the critiques of equity theory’s
ability to predict workers’ responses to the overpaid condition. Undergraduates were hired to be
paid participants in a laboratory task and were assigned to work on a task with one other person.
When given the choice between working together as a team, but with drastically inequitable pay
rates, or the option for both workers to take slightly less pay to work alone, most workers chose
to work alone. This included those in the overpaid condition. When given an opportunity to
transfer a portion of their pay to create equity in pay with their coworker, a majority of workers
in the overpaid condition eventually transferred enough pay to create partial or total equity
(Schmitt & Marwell, 1972, p. 207).
More Recent Testing of Equity Theory
By the late 1980’s researchers became more interested in what equity theory did not
offer; the reasons why two people may respond differently to the same inequity, particularly if
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they have different beliefs or understandings about how or why the inequity occurred
(Cropanzano & Folger, 1989). This interest led to a boom of research in the 1990’s discussing
procedural justice, interactional justice, organizational justice, referent cognitions, fairness and
other theories in similar areas.
Equity theory and in particular its idea of distributive justice, was one of several theories
that, “helped set the stage for the study of procedural justice” (Lind & Tyler, 1988, p. 10). The
reach of branches extending from the equity theory distributive justice research foundations has,
in part, influenced the development of procedural justice, interactional justice, organizational
justice, referent cognitions and by extension, fairness theory. Procedural justice involves the
study of the process or the procedures by which participants’ outcomes are determined, and how
those processes influence their actual equity responses for better or worse (Leventhal, Karuza, &
Fry, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Interactional justice, a type of procedural justice, involves
the study of exchange participants’ perceptions of the interpersonal handling of organizational
changes or procedures and the variation of outcomes different interpersonal approaches provide
(Bies, 1986). Organizational justice combines distributive justice, procedural justice and
interactional justice to study employees’ overall perceptions of decisions that organizations make
such as organizational policies, standard practices and events (Greenberg, 1987). Referent
cognitions theory states the past history of treatment towards referent others, implicit promises
and explicit promises determine to what degree an exchange participant is dissatisfied with an
outcome (Folger, 1987, 1993). Finally, fairness theory, building upon referent cognitions theory,
is a global theory of fairness that explains a person feels their outcome is unfair when they
perceive a better outcome was possible if another, who is the focus of scrutiny or judgment,
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failed to follow expected standards and therefore should have performed better and could have
more positively influenced his or her outcomes (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001).
In the late 1980’s Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles (1987) developed a construct called
equity sensitivity, based on equity theory, that argued individual reactions to equity or inequity
are a result of unique preferences for different input/outcome ratios. This work classified
individuals into one of three classes: benevolents who expect their input/outcome ratios to be less
than referents, sensitives who prefer equity in comparison to referents, and entitleds who prefer
their input/outcome ratios to be more than referents (Huseman et al., 1987, p. 223). This work
lends support that the present study may find only some employees, but not all, respond to an
inequitable salary condition. In an effort to combine equity theory and social exchange theory,
Akerlof and Yellen (1990, p. 255) proposed the fair wage-effort hypothesis which states workers
“proportionately withdraw” their effort as their wages fall short of their equitable wage.
In general, most of the tests of equity theory have been supportive of its predictions
(Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Bolino & Turnley, 2008; Greenberg, 1990b; Greenberg & Cohen,
1982; Mowday, 1987). It is important to note the support though generous, is not entirely
without criticism (Leventhal et al., 1980; Miner, 1984). As summarized by Bolino and Turnley
(2008), the criticisms are most typically as follows: types of responses by individuals are not
well specified; the theory is better equipped to predict responses to under reward than over
reward; it does not take into account other types of distributive rules beyond equity such as
equality based, needs based or hierarchy based and it fails to take into account interactional or
procedural justice (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Fiske, 1992; Folger, 1986; Greenberg, 1990b;
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Leventhal et al., 1980; Mowday, 1987). Even with its criticisms, equity theory is still considered
one of the most important organizational behavior theories (Miner, 2003).
Equity Theory Tested Longitudinally
Most tests of equity theory have been cross sectional in nature. Only a few studies
testing the theory focused on the employee-employer relationship with multiple units over time.
Greenberg (1990a) studied two factories that were forced to accept 15% wage cuts for 10 weeks.
Theft data was available for 10 weeks prior and 10 weeks after in the affected factories, plus a
control factory that was not subject to the pay cut. Using a 3 x 3 mixed-design ANOVA, the
study found employee theft significantly increased during the 10 weeks of the pay cut. Although
the study’s greatest value was in its analysis of adequate versus inadequate explanations of pay
cuts, the author finds, “The data support equity theory’s predictions regarding the likely
responses to underpayment” (Greenberg, 1990a, p. 561).
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, Harder (1991) compared the performance
of free agents, excluding pitchers, in Major League Baseball’s 1977-1980 seasons to a random
sample of non-free agent players and found support for equity theory. He found that under
conditions of an inequitable salary, free-agent players did not reduce their work performance in a
manner that might harm their future salary opportunities, but interestingly they did not show
increases in those performance areas, such as home runs, that would have provided a large
inequitable benefit to their employing baseball team (Harder, 1991).
In their two wave longitudinal study of teachers, Taris, Van Horn, Schaufeli, and
Schreurs (2004, p. 119) could not draw a conclusion regarding the magnitude of the effect of
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equity theory on pay disparity and recommended future researchers use, “a longitudinal design
with more than two waves.” In a longitudinal study of more than 400 employees in Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania in the services sector with annual observation points over four years,
Carraher (2011) found equity theory was able to explain variation in turnover over time using 24
binary logistic regressions for four time periods using six samples for each one.
In another employee-to-employer relationship study, more than 400 professional Chinese
baseball players with annual data for 18 years found significant, but very limited support of,
equity theory through external pay equity as measured by team performance (Jane, 2011). The
same study found internal pay equity, or equal pay among all members on the same team, for
pitchers had a negative effect on team performance, but there was no internal pay equity effect
for hitters. This lead the researcher to conclude internal pay equity was likely important in
positions requiring cooperation which on a baseball team includes nearly everyone, except for
pitchers (Jane, 2011).
Equity theory has also been tested longitudinally in some other employee contexts apart
from the employee-employer relationships addressed in the present study. In a two wave
longitudinal study examining professional-recipient relationships and burnout among human
service professionals, van Dierendonck, Schaufeli, and Buunk (2001) found support for equity
theory as feelings of being more advantaged or more deprived in a professional-recipient
relationship led to higher emotional exhaustion levels in the future. A five year, two wave
longitudinal study of 207 doctors in the Netherlands found a lack of reciprocity in doctor-patient
relationships led to burnout lending support for both equity theory and social exchange over time
22

(Bakker, Schaufeli, Sixma, Bosveld, & Dierendonck, 2000). Studying 466 university employees
at two time points over one year, Maslach and Leiter (2008), found support for equity theory
when at Time 1 those reporting a lack of fairness were found to be more likely to report burnout
at Time 2. These studies lend support that if equity theory is predictive of police officer
responses to stagnant or falling salaries, the longitudinal design of the study should allow for any
changes to be identified.
Equity theory has been used infrequently in the policing, criminal justice and criminology
literature. More specifically, within the police organizational literature, equity theory has not
been tested as a viable theory to predict organizational outcomes for law enforcement agencies.
Nor does it have a history of being considered and rejected within criminal justice and policing
literature. Since its formal introduction by Adams (1965), it has been tested in the industrial
organizational literature more than 160 times (Mowday, 1987, p. 93). It has also been found to
generally be supported in the underpaid condition, commonly included in management and
organizational behavior textbooks (Bolino & Turnley, 2008, p. 31) and has been ranked as one of
the more important of the organization behavior theories (Miner, 2003, p. 252). The following
sections will summarize the limited influence of equity theory in criminal justice research and
provide for a general summary of police organizational research.
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Equity Theory in Criminal Justice and Criminology Research
Equity Theory in Crime and Punishment
Of the few examples of equity theory applied within criminology, perhaps the most high
profile use was by Robert Agnew (1992) to address critiques of earlier versions of strain theory.
Using equity theory as a guide Agnew (1992, p. 54) pointed out:
Individuals in inequitable relationships may engage in delinquency in order to (1)
increase their outcomes (e.g., by theft); (2) lower their inputs (e.g., truancy from school);
(3) lower the outcomes of others (e.g., vandalism, theft, assault); and/or (4) increase the
inputs of others (e.g., by being incorrigible or disorderly).
In a study of responses collected from 124 undergraduate and graduate students, DeJong,
Morris, and Hastorf (1976) asked respondents to read a booklet with a short story of a robbery
with one of eight different outcomes, some of which were more severe, ending in the killing of a
restaurant owner. In others one offender was much more responsible than the accomplice and in
some cases one of the accomplices escaped and was not brought to trial. The respondents were
then asked to act as the judge in the case and issue sentences to the suspects based on the version
of the story they read. The study found support for equity theory in the attempts by the
respondents to restore equity between victims and offenders and between offenders and
accomplices.
In a similar way, Longshore (1979) used equity theory to test two constructs; inequity
between an offender and victim and inequity between an offender and an accomplice. This study
involved 166 undergraduate students who were randomly provided a fictitious robbery scenario
committed by two offenders and with one of eight different outcomes. The students were asked
to sentence the main character in the fictitious story to as many years in prison as they felt
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appropriate, rate the seriousness of the crime on an eleven point scale and assign a percentage of
the responsibility for the crime to each offender, totaling 100%. The study found support for
equity theory regarding inequity between the offender and the victim as the offenders were
punished more harshly by the respondents for more serious crimes. However, for inequity
between the offender and the accomplice, support for equity theory was mixed. Respondents
were more lenient towards offenders when their accomplice was not caught, but were not moved
to punish a suspect more harshly who was more responsible than their accomplice.
In a study examining the discrepancies between the views of criminal court actors and the
opinions of the general public, Tremblay, Cordeau, and Quimet (1994) relied on equity theory to
analyze their results. The study utilized 299 residents who worked outside the criminal courts
and 234 courtroom actors consisting of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and probation
officers in the Montreal, Quebec area. The researchers anticipated both groups would attempt to
restore victim to offender equity, but they theorized courtroom actors would take into account
the risk for errors in convictions and return less severe punishments. The respondents were
asked to read five fictitious criminal cases and recommend sentencing in each case with options
for fines, victim compensation, probation, community work and prison time. As predicted by the
study authors, criminal courtroom actors perceived the reestablishment of equity between victim
and offender in sentencing required less punishment for the offender than the greater punishment
the general public perceived was equitable.
Wagstaff and Preece (1997) tested three hypotheses, one of which was derived from
equity theory, as possible explanations for preferences of over punishment or under punishment.
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Respondents in the study, 80 undergraduate students, were asked what they felt was the
appropriate sentence, and were forced to choose between a choice of over or under punishment
of their sentencing choice in the fictitious crime sentencing scenario. While there was no
preference found for under or over punishment for a minor offense scenario, every respondent in
the study chose over punishment for the offender convicted of the more serious crime of rape
rather than under punishment. This was different than the lack of preference the researchers
anticipated and they concluded they failed to find support for their equity theory based
hypothesis.
Equity Theory in Policing
For the purposes of the current study, it is important to note the following studies which
specifically speak to policing. Even more important to note is the application of equity theory,
which has historically been used as an individual level analysis, is in these instances used to
explain agency level outcomes. This use of equity theory for an agency level analysis is
representative of the current study.
In a study of final offer arbitration outcomes between New Jersey municipal police
departments and police bargaining units from 1978-1996, Mas (2004b) found arrest rates were
10% higher at agencies where officer police unions won at arbitration versus those agencies
where police unions lost at final offer arbitration. After controlling for changing crime rates and
employment levels in the police departments, the effect was first noticeable three months after
arbitration, typically peaked at eight months and lasted for at least 22 months (Mas, 2004b, pp.
167-168). In the study, the FBI UCR data used included only “felony crimes and arrests” (Mas,
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2004b, p. 164), which is indicative of the less discretionary, UCR Part I arrest rates. This lends
support to the expectation that as municipal police officer salaries fall in relation to other
regional municipal agencies, officers will likely respond by conducting fewer arrests. It is
important to note that the effect of the arrest rate discrepancies may be even stronger if the
measure was based on the more discretionary arrests from Part II arrests instead of the less
discretionary FBI UCR Part I arrests used by Mas (2004b).
Additionally, as Mas (2004b) observed, a causal cycle may present itself with a similar
response delayed by several months, a peak displayed eight months later and with the possibility
to remain visible for up to nearly two years. Mitchell and James (2001) explain the initial delay
in observing an effect is the causal interval or equilibration period. This is followed by a
stabilized effect or equilibrium condition (L. R. James, Mulaik, & Brett, 1982) and finally ending
at a point where the probability of linking X as the causation of Y becomes uncertain, known as
the entropic period (Kelly & McGrath, 1988). Though the use of the historical CJAP data set
does not allow manipulation of the annual collection data points into the more sensitive points,
such as the date of ruling in final arbitration found in the data set used by Mas (2004b), it may
allow for some estimation into the beginning of the entropic period.
Looking specifically at police officers, McIntyre (1990) surveyed Vermont municipal
police officers who quit their jobs to work elsewhere between fiscal years 1986 and 1988. Of the
32 possible reasons for leaving presented in the survey, the two highest scoring responses with
somewhat or very important rankings from the study subjects were: 70% “to obtain better
benefits,” and 69% “to attain better salary” (McIntyre, 1990, p. 10). This indicates that for those
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municipal police officers who actually leave an agency to work elsewhere, low salary can be an
important motivating factor. In addition to equity theory, police organizational characteristics
and job satisfaction research provides additional insight into how officers likely respond to the
underpaid condition.
Police Organizational and Job Satisfaction Literature
A substantial body of police organizational theory research has focused on identifying the
structural characteristics of police agencies, identifying factors that explain their makeup and
debating the influence of internal versus external influences on them. Department
characteristics, such as total staffing, annual expenditures and the task scope, influence an
agency’s structure (Maguire & Uchida, 2000; Paoline & Sloan, 2003). Organizational age and
two types of environmental features, dispersion and instability, also appear in the literature as
influential on an agency’s structural characteristics (Maguire, 2003, pp. 214-215). Structural
characteristics of police agencies discussed in the literature include administrative density,
formalization, and three types of differentiation. Administrative density is a percentage of
personnel employed in administrative tasks (Langworthy, 1986). Formalization is a measure of
the extent to which an agency utilizes formal written policies, rules and procedures (Hall,
Johnson, & Haas, 1967). Occupational differentiation is the proportion of a police department’s
workforce that is made up of civilian employees without arrest powers versus sworn officers,
sometimes described as “civilianization” (Crank, 1989, p. 167). Functional differentiation
measures to what degree a police agency utilizes specialized units or officers for select types of
traditional law enforcement tasks. Vertical differentiation, which focuses an organization’s
hierarchal form and size, has been measured as the proportion of sworn personnel at the rank of
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sergeant or higher (Langworthy, 1985), a ratio of the chief’s salary to that of a starting officer
(Maguire, 1997; Paoline, Terrill, & Rossler, 2014) and by counting the number of potential
promotion levels from patrolman to the highest rank (Crank & Wells, 1991). Unfortunately, the
data for these structural characteristics is not available for each year or from each agency within
this study.
The type of policing style law enforcement agencies employ, which may influence arrests
per officer, is extensively covered in the literature. Wilson (1968) described three types of police
departments, defined by their handling of crime and order maintenance: watchman, legalistic or
service. Wilson’s three styles generally overlap with three of the four policing styles collectively
described by Perrow (1967) as a framework for comparative analysis of organizations. Perrow’s
craft technology, routine technology and engineering technology formats are comparable to
Wilson’s watchman, legalistic and service styles respectively, while his nonroutine technology
had no direct equivalent (Langworthy, 1986, pp. 77-79). Agencies employing a watchman (craft
technology) style, focusing on major crimes at the expense of order maintenance, would likely
have a negative influence on discretionary arrests by officers for minor offenses. Those
employing a legalistic (routine technology) style, treating order maintenance issues as strictly
criminal matters, would likely experience a positive relationship with discretionary arrests by
officers. Service oriented (engineering technology) agencies, which prioritize all requests for
service regardless of the type, would likely vary by community in their number of discretionary
arrests for minor crimes per officer. While extrapolations on arrests per officer can be made with
knowledge of an agency’s policing style, the literature offers only a limited indication on how
they may influence voluntary officer turnover. Wilson’s (1968) observations of lower pay and
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limited or preferential promotions at watchman type agencies, not found at legalistic and service
departments, was suggestive of higher turnover for that style of policing.
An employee’s mindset that he or she plans to separate from his or her employer in the
near future, frequently referred by researchers as “intent to quit”, has consistently been found to
be the best known predictor of whether or not an employee will voluntarily leave his or her job.
This finding has been reinforced by three meta-analysis studies by Steel and Ovalle (1984), Tett
and Meyer (1993) and Griffeth, Hom, and Gaertner (2000). When intent to quit data is not
available, as is the case in this study, it may be helpful to examine its most influential predictor,
job satisfaction (Lambert, Hogan, & Barton, 2001). Researchers have found this negative
relationship between job satisfaction and voluntary turnover, specifically significant among
police officers (Fielding & Fielding, 1987; Sparger & Giacopassi, 1983).
Education level has an inconsistent history of mixed association with police officer job
satisfaction. Lefkowitz’s (1974) research at a Midwestern municipal police department found
officers who had completed some part of a college degree were more satisfied with their pay and
more involved with their jobs. Education was not found to significantly contribute to job
satisfaction in a study of 756 police officers at a southwestern police department (Griffin,
Dunbar, & McGill, 1978). Education did not influence job satisfaction or attrition in a study of
more than 1500 Victoria (Australia) police officers (Sparger & Giacopassi, 1983). Pre-service
education was observed to be the largest contributor to officer job satisfaction at the Oakland PD,
but while it shared a positive relationship at the Detroit PD, it was also the “least important
factor” (E. S. Buzawa, 1984, p. 72). In a study of 1472 officers at five agencies, Dantzker (1992)
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found patrol officers with college degrees and up to five years of experience reported the highest
job satisfaction, while equally educated officers with six or more years on the job reported the
least. Years later Zhao, Thurman, and He (1999) found no statistical significance for officer
education on job satisfaction at a medium size police department in the northwest. More
recently, Paoline et al. (2014) found a statistically significant negative association for officers
with a bachelor’s degree or higher education level on job satisfaction using a dataset from seven
municipal police departments, all from different states.
In an analysis of a survey conducted at a medium sized police department, Zhao et al.
(1999) found the work environment provided by a law enforcement agency to a police officer
was the most influential predictor of job satisfaction, not employee demographics. Officer
demographics were also found to be of little value when determining job satisfaction at16
Alabama police agencies that participated in a survey conducted by Carlan (2007). Finally,
researchers of other types of officer occupational attitudes have also found only modest, weak or
no association with employee demographics (Morash & Haarr, 1995; Paoline, Myers, & Worden,
2000). Organizational characteristics may be more influential.
The size of a law enforcement agency may influence officer job satisfaction. In the
1970s, the Quality of Employment Survey (QES) was a nationwide survey of paid employees
working 20 or more hours a week sampled across all job types. Using 1977 QES data and after
controlling for salary and fringe benefits, Idson (1990, p. 1007) found larger “establishments” (a
single plant location or physical company location) to be less flexible in the ways they conducted
business leading to lower employee job satisfaction. In a similar finding within criminal justice
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research, small agency size, measured by 100 or fewer sworn officers, has been found to be
positively correlated with job satisfaction in an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) conducted with
data from fourteen police agencies located in different states by Dantzker (1997). If an agency
had 101-500 sworn officers, its size was found to have a negative correlation to job satisfaction
(Dantzker, 1997, p. 315).
In addition to pay and benefits , Sparger and Giacopassi (1983) found anger with police
management and a lack of organizational sensitivity for input on decision making, recognition
and promotion accounted for the majority of officer job dissatisfaction. Utilizing a questionnaire
sent to 581 Victoria (Australia) Police Officers who voluntarily quit before qualifying for
retirement, 611 who retired with a pension and 500 who were still on the job, S. James and
Hendry (1991) found those who voluntarily left early cited management decisions and
dissatisfaction with policies as their primary sources of dissatisfaction.
To conclude, equity theory has provided a foundation as to how police officers are likely
to respond to stagnant or falling wages. It has been tested extensively in the industrial
organizational literature (Mowday, 1987), but has rarely been applied in the criminal justice
research field. The job satisfaction research has solidified the link between job satisfaction,
intent to quit and attrition. Finally, the police organizational research has provided an overview
of what may influence officers’ decisions to quit their jobs or conduct fewer arrests, to include
agency level characteristics such as policing style and department size.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH QUESTIONS, DATA AND METHODS

This chapter begins with a brief explanation of the research design used for the present
study followed by a discussion of the unit of analysis and the data sets utilized. The variables
chosen for the analyses are explained and labeled. The chapter concludes with a detailed
discussion of the chosen statistical analyses, TSCS, along with a roadmap of how this type of
analyses was chosen. Appendix A and B are referenced for a more in-depth discussion of why
group based trajectory modeling (TRAJ) and panel data analysis were not the appropriate
analysis tools for the present study.
Current Study
Equity Theory Suggested Longitudinal Design
Longitudinal data from 11 consecutive years was chosen based on the recommendation of
other researchers who have tested equity theory over time with fewer waves than what would be
ideal (Taris et al., 2004). As there is evidence that studies of much shorter duration were able to
find support for equity theory’s anticipated responses to underpayment (Greenberg, 1990a), the
present study with 11 years of data should be sufficient to identify if such a response by Florida
municipal police officers and their salaries occurs.
In most of the equity theory research the same methodological limitation appears over
and over again; almost all of it is short term in nature (Vecchio, 1982). And as pointed out by
Cosier and Dalton (1983, p. 317), “a longitudinal approach to the examination of inequity effects
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is more appropriate than merely focusing on perceived inequity in a current time period.” For
these reasons the present study’s use of longitudinal data over 11 years with annual data points
should add to the limited longitudinal equity theory literature. It is important to consider issues
of time, particularly when events occur, as pointed out by Mitchell and James (2001, p. 545) who
note, “We can and should do better.”
Research Questions
1. Does a municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police
agencies lead to decreased work input?
H1 = A municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police
agencies leads to decreased work input.
H0 = A municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police
agencies does not lead to decreased work input.
2. Does a municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police
agencies lead to increased attrition?
H1 = A municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police
agencies leads to increased attrition.
H0 = A municipal police agency’s pay falling behind other regional municipal police
agencies does not lead to increased attrition.

Unit of Analysis and Study Population
The unit of analysis in this study is the municipal (city) police agency located within a
MSA in Florida. This aggregate unit of analysis, municipal police agencies, was chosen over an
individual unit of analysis, (police officers), based on data availability. It should also allow for
aggregate inferences, or those related to police officers collectively through the experience of
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their employing department, to be drawn from the study. Such inferences should be more useful
for police administrators when making department wide decisions on police officer pay.
While an attitudinal study might seem more valuable at first blush, such an approach
would not serve the purpose of the present study. Law enforcement managers are familiar with
police officers complaining, as cynicism within the profession has been extensively studied in
criminal justice research (Langworthy, 1987). In addition, police officer behaviors’ have not
always been found to be consistent with their attitudes (Worden & Shepard, 1996). The value of
this study is testing what law enforcement agencies experience in response to low or falling pay,
not quantifying how much police officers see it as unfair or a point of irritation.
A single officer’s voluntary action to reduce his or her work inputs or quit an agency does
occur at the individual level. However, when multiple officers’ behaviors change collectively,
leading to a significant change in the normal distribution of work input and/or attrition that
occurs at a police department, the end result is an organizational level experience. This is
particularly true if these changes are a response to an organizational policy, practice or
management decision. While one could envision a study that focuses on the responses of
individual officers, why some responded one way while others responded another, this study is
singularly concerned with the outcomes experienced by the agencies themselves. Do falling or
stagnant salaries influence attrition experienced by the agency? Do falling or stagnant salaries
influence the work inputs, obtained by a municipal police agency, per employed officer?
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Data Sources
The variables used in this data came from two sources. The salary and attrition data
came from a statutorily mandated survey administered annually by the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement (FDLE) called the Criminal Justice Agency Profile (CJAP) (Florida
Department of Law Enforcement, 2013). A special request was made to FDLE to obtain the
historical survey data as only the past few years’ data was available online. For the work input
variable, UCR Part II arrests, a special request was made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Uniform Crime Reporting Program (FBI UCR) for the Arrest Master Files from 2001-2011 as
this data is not available online. Participation in the FBI UCR program is optional (Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2013) and although the vast majority of municipal agencies provided
UCR part II arrest information every year of the study time frame, 28 of the 189 municipal police
agencies did not provide information for at least one participating year and were excluded from
the final analysis.
Criminal Justice Agency Profile (CJAP) Data Set
FDLE began collecting salary, benefits, minimum education requirements, training and
other variables from every law enforcement agency in Florida beginning with the passage of
Florida State Statute 943.18 (Compensation and benefits study; recommendation) in 1996, which
states:
—The commission shall make a comprehensive study of the compensation and benefits
paid to law enforcement officers and correctional officers throughout the state. Among
the items to be researched shall be variation in salary scale, education and training of
officers, retirement and pension programs, and any other factors on which compensation
is based. The commission shall make recommendations to the Legislature for achieving
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uniformity in compensation for officers with equal or comparable responsibilities,
experience, education, and training.
For the CJAP data collection, every law enforcement agency in Florida is contacted each
year by the FDLE. The CJAP data was more useful for this analysis than the more commonly
used U.S. Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
(LEMAS) survey, which collects only a few of the same variables, but has two significant
limitations: It only directly contacts larger agencies every three to four years and only samples
the smaller agencies with less than 100 sworn officers (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013). For
this study’s years of interest, 2001-2011, the LEMAS survey was only administered in 2003 and
2007. In comparison, the CJAP is administered annually and asks for the survey to be completed
by answering questions reflective of June 30th of the given research year (W. M. Doerner &
Doerner, 2012a, p. 665). It captures data on hiring requirements, number of sworn officers,
officer demographics, types of insurance offered, minimum salary, supplemental programs,
training provided, special units, benefits and type of retirement program offered.
The CJAP contains data on municipal, county and state law enforcement for every year
from 2001-2011. Additionally, as mentioned previously, differences in state law enforcement
agencies such as the Florida Highway Patrol, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Florida
Department of Insurance Fraud, county sheriff’s departments and municipal law enforcement
agencies posed a threat to the internal validity of this analysis. For this reason only municipal
police agencies were chosen for this analysis. For the present study the CJAP provided historical
data for every municipal police agency in FL for the following variables from 2001-2011:
Officer salary and attrition.
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The CJAP data set has only been used only a handful of times for social science research.
It has been used to analyze the diffusion of accreditation among Florida law enforcement
agencies using descriptive statistics and probit regression (W. G. Doerner & Doerner, 2009). A
panel data analysis was used to test the influence of unionization on county sheriff’s offices
salaries (W. M. Doerner & Doerner, 2010) and municipal police agencies salaries (W. M.
Doerner & Doerner, 2012a). W. M. Doerner and Doerner (2012b) again used the CJAP data set
to conduct a random-effects Tobit analysis that determined that successful completion of police
department accreditation did not increase clearance rates, but did lead to increases in the annual
budget and number of sworn officers at police agencies. While not the sole focus of their
research, the CJAP data set has been used several times as a limited reference in analyses by
Mesloh, Henych, and Wolf (2008) to obtain police to citizen ratios, by Livingood, Woodhouse,
and Wludyka (2009) to obtain data regarding the sworn strength of Florida police agencies, and
by H. Smith and Banyan (2010) to obtain Florida police agency take home car policies.
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Data Set
In 1927 the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) started work on what is
today the UCR. The IACP first published its data in January, 1930. Legislation was then passed
authorizing the U.S. Attorney General to collect crime information and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) assumed the responsibility for the data collection and reporting in September
1930 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004b). The primary motivation to establish the UCR
was to counteract media generated “crime wave” publicity (Maltz, 1977). Today more than
18,000 law enforcement agencies provide data to the FBI UCR program annually (Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2013). The UCR program collects summarized data on eight serious
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crimes known as Part I offenses, data on arrests for all crimes, data on law enforcement officers
killed and assaulted and information on hate crimes (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004b).
After collection this information is summarized and published in annual reports. One significant
limitation of UCR data is that reporting is voluntary and this voluntary reporting leads to some
missing crime data (Maltz & Targonski, 2002).
Variables
Officer salary is the independent variable used to represent police officer wages. The
dependent variable arrests is used to measure police officer work input. Attrition is used to
measure officers quitting their jobs. This section will provide detailed descriptions and a
discussion as to why these variables were chosen and how they were measured. Table 1
summarizes the variable names, labels, descriptions, source and anticipated direction of change
at the completion of the data analysis.
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Table 1
Definitions of Variables and Data Sources
Variable

Label

Description

Source

Agency Salary Compared to
Regional Agencies

Salary

Z - score above or
below the mean
regional starting
officer salary

CJAP

Anticipated
Direction
N/A

UCR Part II Arrests

Arrests

Number of UCR Part
II Arrests per Officer

FBI UCR

(-)

Agency Attrition

Attrition

Percent of Sworn
Officers who
Separated from Dept.

CJAP

(+)

40

Independent Variables
Officer Salary Compared to Regional Agencies
Underpaid workers experience less job satisfaction than their equitably paid counterparts
(Pritchard et al., 1972). Salaries are important to police officers. Rivers, Savery, and Soutar
(1994, p. 253) found 61% of a sample of West Australian police officers felt their basic wage
was the most important compensation factor while the next closest factor was the availability of
long service leave at just 19%.
In order to interpret the results of the present study it is important to understand how
police are paid and how it is different from many other professions. It is extremely rare for
police to be paid in any form other than hourly or salary. In a rare instance the city of Orange,
CA experimented with linking police officer salaries to crime reduction in the 1970’s, but did not
stay with the system (Greiner, Dahl, Hatry, & Millar, 1977). Generally the use of merit pay
systems are rare in government (Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991). In those rare instances it is used
by law enforcement, it is typically followed by cynicism about their application (Johnson, 2012,
p. 200).
In many professions, employees have some autonomy and individual control over their
pay opportunities, sometimes through increased performance. In police work, goals to achieve
for additional pay creates a situation that is highly ambiguous and generally not feasible (Frey,
Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013). The performance measures by which to pay an officer tend to
largely be out of his or her control such as crime rate in assigned area, which varies by
neighborhood factors or number of arrests where people must violate the law in order to make a
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lawful arrest (Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, & Schaefer, 2009, p. 484). A good example in the
Netherlands was translated and summarized by Thiel and Leeuw (2002); when performance
measures for arrests and clearance rates were improving in the Netherlands, serious crime was
also increasing, something the officer performance indicators did not reflect, pointing out the
difficulty in creating performance measures that coincide with lower crime rates (Wiebrens &
Essers, 1999).
One reason nearly all municipal police officers are paid in the same way is that it is likely
a reflection of police agencies demonstrating isomorphism, as explained by institutional theory
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As “highly institutionalized organizations” police departments are
strongly shaped by their institutional environments in an attempt to attain legitimacy (Crank &
Langworthy, 1992). Many of them likely pay their officers hourly with no incentives simply
because that is what all the other agencies are doing.
Some agencies offer a position called master patrol officer (or similar titles such as patrol
officer 1, 2, or 3) to increase pay opportunities for line police officers (Zhao, Lovrich, &
Robinson, 2001). Many of those opportunities are not actual rungs on the rank structure ladder
as they typically have no added supervisory responsibility (King, 2003) and because of this are
likely part of the pay a line police officer anticipates once he or she has enough time on the job to
qualify. Though it occurs on rare occasions in police work, officers are typically unable to skip
over ranks (Jacob, Cushenberry, & Grabarek, 2011; Maurer, Solamon, & Troxtel, 1998) in an
effort to quickly increase their salary through promotion. And unlike many other industries,
police agencies rarely use past performance of an officer as a serious consideration tool in the
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promotional process (Jacob et al., 2011). Further, there is some evidence to suggest many police
officers are uninterested in police promotional process (E. Buzawa, Austin, & Bannon, 1994;
Scarborough, Van Tubergen, Gaines, & Whitlow, 1999) and the more experienced a police
officer is, the less likely the officer can picture himself or herself being promoted (Gau, Terrill,
& Paoline, 2013). In short, there are not enough promotional opportunities to compensate for the
stagnant wages of an entire police force. For these reasons, the opportunity for promotion is not
viewed as a threat to this agency level analysis.
The independent variable of primary interest is officer salary (salary). This variable is a
z-score representing whether a given agency’s average starting salary for officers is above or
below the mean for that of other agencies in the same region. This will allow for salary inequity
to be identified in a more meaningful way, comparing the salary of one agency only with those
that an officer could easily consider working for without the significant effort and costs
associated with moving to another region of the state.
For the purposes of the present study, regional agencies are municipal law enforcement
agencies located within the same MSA. Most incorporated cities in Florida operate and maintain
their own municipal police agencies. Those municipal police agencies are typically located
within a single county. Groups of counties that are perceived to have strong communal and
business interconnectivity are called MSAs. By federal law and a 1951 executive order, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is tasked with periodically updating MSAs and every
10 years conducting a comprehensive review of MSA standards and definitions, the last of which
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occurred in 2010 (Zients, 2013). MSAs are defined by the OMB as follows (Sunstein, 2010, p.
37252):
Metropolitan Statistical Area—A Core Based Statistical Area associated with at least one
urbanized area that has a population of at least 50,000. The Metropolitan Statistical Area
comprises the central county or counties containing the core, plus adjacent outlying
counties having a high degree of social and economic integration with the central county
or counties as measured through commuting.
MSAs may be more simplistically described as regions within which a majority of
residents regularly cross county lines to participate in social activities, business activities and
commute to work. Very rural counties that do not appear to have a high degree of cross-county
commuting, business activity and social activity with the central counties of MSAs are not
grouped into the regions defined as MSAs. As seen in Figure 1, of the 67 counties within
Florida, 44 are grouped into MSAs and 23 are not. See Appendix C for a detailed listing of
Florida’s MSAs. MSAs do not form a distinction between urban and rural areas as many
counties included within MSAs have urban and rural areas within the county borders.
Predominately rural counties with a high percentage of residents commuting to a regional urban
center for employment are included in that urban center’s MSA (Sunstein, 2010, p. 37246).
As MSAs offer a snapshot of regional areas in which the majority of area residents live,
work and commute; as such, these areas provide an opportunity to confidently calculate a
regional average salary for police officers. Municipal police officers who are looking for a new
job or comparing their salary to other police officers are most likely to be looking within their
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region at police agencies where the officer could reasonably commute. For this reason, MSAs
are the most appropriate conceptual boundary by which to define the regional municipal police
agencies that are competing with one another for the same police officers and police officer
candidates.
While MSAs were used for this analysis, the much less populated Micropolitan Statistical
Areas (Micros) with commuting focused around a small urban population of more than 10,000,
but less than 50,000 were not used in the primary analysis of the data due to concerns they did
not contain enough municipal police agencies from which to draw study conclusions; however,
they were used for a secondary analysis as a check on the robustness of the results from the
MSA-only analyses. Counties that were neither part of a Metropolitan nor a Micropolitan
Statistical Area, or lacking an urban center of at least 10,000 people to which people regularly
commute, were also not used for this analysis due to an insufficient number of regional
municipal police agencies.
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Figure 1. Florida metropolitan statistical areas map.
In addition to salary, a second independent variable salary (t-1) lagged by one year will
be included in all models. In a study that found changes in police officer behavior after winning
or losing a contract for officer salaries at arbitration, Mas (2004b, pp. 167-168) found officer
responses to be first measurable a full three months after the arbitration outcome. This
previously identified delayed response by police officers to salary news and the likely delays
associated with applying for a new employer if an officer plans to quit working for his or her
current municipal support the inclusion of salary (t-1). This variable is a z-score that is
calculated in the exact same way as salary except its relationship to the dependent variables will
be evaluated one year later. In other words, salary (t-1) represents whether a given agency’s
average starting salary for officers was above or below the mean for that of other agencies in the
region the previous year.
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Dependent Variables
Agency UCR Part II Arrests per Officer
Generally speaking researchers have found the majority of an officer’s day is made up of
discretionary time in which they choose what activities to spend their time doing and where they
want to do it (Mastrofski & Parks, 1990) and resist “supervisory incursions into their
discretionary domain” (Linn, 2009, p. 12). Mastrofski (2004, p. 112) points out that controlling
where an officer should be working, such as in hot spots policing, has been done with success,
but forcing officers to undertake specific police actions within those locations has generally been
met with considerable resistance. Police departments are simply not structured in a manner that
allows for the quality of an officer’s work to be closely monitored (Reiss, 1971). Officers
control quality and decision making in police work, as described by Bouza (2002, p. 6):
Another one of the hidden truths about policing is that, although the brass can decide the
general thrust and direction, the slug in the trenches retains the power to work her or his
will in countless ways. The result is that guidelines become rough limits, within which a
great deal of independent action can be exercised.
In policing, discretionary decisions by officers on the street are both necessary and by
their nature, difficult to control (Sykes, 1985). Bittner (1970) described this discretion as
“intuitive,” but intuitive is a somewhat abstract concept, making it difficult to control or attack.
In fact, police officer discretion may be so strong that failing to reign it in may have been a
contributing factor in the stalling of the police professionalism movement in the 1970s (Crank,
2010; Manning, 1978). The staying power of officers’ discretionary arrest activity regardless of
management expectations likely allows it to be a useful way to find equity in seemingly
unbalanced police officer to employer relationships.
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UCR Part II arrests are known to be significantly more discretionary than UCR Part I
arrests. UCR Part I arrests are inclusive of criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson. Nearly all UCR Part I crimes have
a specific individual or business as a victim. Meanwhile, most of the Part II offenses listed in the
UCR handbook typically lack a specific individual victim to the crime and the State or the
community are typically considered the victim. These can be seen in such examples as drug
abuse violations, gambling, driving under the influence, liquor law violations, criminal traffic
violations and curfew violations (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004b, p. 8). Though there are
a few exceptions such as forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, and embezzlement that police officers
do not have discretion to ignore, the majority of arrests for offenses categorized as Part II could
be described as discretionary and optional for officers to either ignore or simply provide a verbal
warning in lieu of arrest (Brown, 1988; Wilson, 1968). UCR part II arrest data has been
described and used to capture, “a mix of less serious felonies and misdemeanors” (Snow, Baker,
& Leon, 1989, p. 536). Enforcement of these Part II crimes, particularly the ones that lack an
individual victim, is generally left to the officer to decide if any action should be taken. Even if
probable cause for an arrest exists, police officers are generally provided the discretion to decide
whether or not to effect an arrest for a misdemeanor crime (Kochel, Wilson, & Mastrofski, 2011,
p. 477).
Many of the offenses categorized as Part II such as criminal traffic violations, public
nuisance, public intoxication and drug crimes may not even be discovered by officers if they do
not actively seek them out. In other words, when police officers do not want to work, many Part
II offenses are the ones they will let slip. For example, a study in Austin, TX found 40% of Part
48

II arrests were of homeless men (Snow et al., 1989, p. 537). If police do not seek out the
homeless or if they simply tell them to move along and rather than make an arrest, officers can
measurably decrease their inputs and still keep their jobs. Vingilis, Blefgen, Colbourne, and
Reynolds (1986) saw this first hand when they found department morale problems were one of
the top five DUI “arrest-inhibiting factors” for officers deciding to arrest or not arrest. More
serious Part I offenses are more difficult for police officers to ignore without risking their jobs.
FBI UCR Part II arrests per officer data is used to operationalize reductions in officer
inputs an agency experiences. It is an available, reasonable measure to possibly identify a
concerted agency wide effort by officers to reduce inputs and has been used successfully in the
past as a measure of discretionary, proactive law enforcement activity (Johnson, 2012). Part II
arrests in a given year are divided by the number of employed officers. This establishes a rate of
Part II arrests per officer for each agency and capture changes in the work inputs an agency
experiences from each sworn employee. For additional details, see Appendix D for a full list of
all UCR Part II Crimes.
Agency Attrition
McIntyre (1990) found that salary, benefits and retirement were the primary reasons
municipal officers quit their municipal law enforcement jobs. Competitive salary is one way an
organization conveys appreciation to an officer for his or her work effort and participates in
reciprocity with him or her in an employer to employee relationship. While a lack of reciprocity
from citizens towards police officers has been found to have no effect on officer burnout, a lack
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of reciprocity from an officer’s own agency has been discovered to have a strong association
(Kop, Euwema, & Schaufeli, 1999).
The dependent variable attrition used in this study captures the attrition, described as a
percentage of the total number of sworn officers for each given agency. Agency attrition is
reported by the Florida CJAP survey as total sworn officers who left the department for the given
year indiscriminate of whether an officer separated as part of a planned retirement, an early
retirement due to injury, a firing or simply quitting an agency for another job (Florida
Department of Law Enforcement, 2013). It is possible that in any given year, select agencies
may have several planned retirements that are unrelated to officers quitting due to stagnant or
falling wages. Occasionally police agencies also attempt to downsize to save money without
layoffs by offering early retirement incentives (Macinnes, 2010). In a particular year, these
actions can spike attrition in a single year and reduce the overall size of a sworn police force for
reasons other than voluntary attrition in response to low salaries. With more than 100 municipal
agencies reporting every year over an 11 year period, such noise in a data set this large should
not be a threat to the overall analysis.
While it would be ideal to use an attrition variable that captures only officers voluntarily
quitting before reaching retirement, such data is not available in the CJAP. To calculate the
attrition variable, the number of officers who left an agency in a given year is divided by the
sworn personnel in that agency. This creates the officer attrition rate or the percentage of the
total sworn force that left the agency during the year.
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Control Variables
Chappell, MacDonald, and Manz (2006, p. 294) found a city’s overall crime rate
positively influenced arrest rates for all index offenses (UCR Part I crimes), while the ratio of
officers per residents negatively influenced them. Officers per 1,000 residents and annual Part I
crimes will be included in the present analysis as control variables. Annual Part II crimes could
not be used as a control variable because the UCR program does not collect this data, only arrests
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004a). Part I crimes will be used instead as it has been
theorized agencies experiencing more crimes have less interest in discretionary Part II type
arrests (Mastrofski, Ritti, & Hoffmaster, 1987). Annual Part I crimes and city populations for
computing officer-to-residents ratios were obtained from the FBI’s UCR database. The officerto-residents ratio was computed by dividing the annual CJAP agency sworn strength numbers by
the UCR provided population data for the given year and then multiplying by 1,000.
The size of an employer has been found to influence job satisfaction for employees
(Idson, 1990) and specifically for police officers (Dantzker, 1997). Total sworn officers are used
as a proxy for agency size and included as a control variable. The ratio of officers per 1,000
residents, which is different from total sworn officers, is included as control variable for attrition.
These control variables are included as job satisfaction known to be the most influential factor on
an employee’s intent to quit (Lambert et al., 2001).
In addition to a regular salary, another financial benefit found at many, but not all, police
departments is a pension plan. In Florida, the state managed pension is called the Florida
Retirement System (FRS) and is portable for vested participants to bring with them to any other
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participating city agency, but not to municipal agencies with locally managed pension plans
("Retirement planning; A strong case for making the switch in Venice [Editorial]," 2006). Local
pension plans are not portable to another agency and could influence an officer’s view of their
total financial compensation or their opportunities to leave one law enforcement employer for
another. For these reasons, both local and state pension plans will be used as control variables
for both attrition and salary. They will be coded as “0” when not in use by an agency and “1” for
when it is the type of pension plan offered to officers.
A Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP) provides an employee who would normally
leave an agency at a typical retirement age, in a state or local defined benefits plan, the
opportunity to remain on the job for years longer at their normal salary while simultaneously
accruing pension payments. DROP programs are intended to reduce attrition (M. W. Walsh,
2004) and are financially enriching. For these reasons it will be included as a control variable for
both salary and attrition. This variable is obtained through the CJAP database and will be coded
as “0” if such a plan is not offered by an agency and “1” for when it is made available for
officers to participate in.
To account for non-salary expenditures beyond salary and pension, the availability of a
take home car program is used as a control variable for salary. Police agencies use this perk to
attract and retain officers (W. G. Doerner, 1995) and such programs have been found to improve
employee morale (Sheldon & Theodore, 1997). A take home car program allows an officer to
drive a police vehicle assigned to and from work leading to personal savings in gasoline and
vehicle maintenance costs for the employee. This variable was obtained from the annual CJAP
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survey. Other non-salary expenditure control variables for salary that are used in include annual
vacation hours, sick hours and the number of paid holidays. Law enforcement agencies in
Florida differ substantially on this measure, ranging from no paid holidays offered at all to some
that recognize more than those defined by the federal government. In addition control variables
for fully subsidized health insurance, partially subsidized health insurance, fully subsidized life
insurance, partially subsidized life insurance, fully subsidized dental insurance, partially
subsidized dental insurance, fully subsidized disability insurance and partially subsidized
disability insurance are included in the analysis in an attempt to capture an officer’s full
compensation. These variables are obtained from the CJAP database and are coded as a
numerical representation of the number of holidays officers receive additional pay for with a
range of 0 to 16 within this data set.
Two additional control variables were not influenced by the empirical literature on
policing or equity theory, but rather are a statistical requirement of modern TSCS. Including a
lagged version of the dependent variable in a TSCS analysis is generally called for as part of the
recommended statistical process (Beck & Katz, 1996). For this reason, both arrests (t-1) and
attrition (t-1) are used as control variables.
Research Design
The present study uses a TSCS analysis which has been called one of the best types of
quasi-experimental designs (Campbell & Stanley, 1967, p. 57). The design for the current study
uses data collected annually beginning in the year 2001 through the year 2011. Florida
municipal police agencies located within a MSA are the unit of analysis. Of the 189 municipal
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agencies that were in existence for all eleven of the years under study, 122 of them had no
missing data for any of the study variables. As all 122 of these units were included in the
analysis, no sampling of the study population, Florida municipal police agencies located within a
MSA, was required for this analysis. Conclusions inferred from this study are directed to this
specific study population.
The present study utilizes TSCS analysis to test the hypothesized outcomes as explained
by equity theory. This type of research design provides advantages over simple cross-sectional
analysis through potential for detecting causal relationships and significantly increasing degrees
of freedom (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a), as the present study uses the population and not a sample of
all municipal police agencies in Florida within a MSA.
Statistical Analysis
A type of panel design called TSCS analysis from 2001-2011 will be used. A panel data
set, such as the CJAP, follows a sample over time, which creates multiple observations for each
case (Hsiao, 2003); however, different types of analyses are available for different types of data
and research purposes. Prior to analysis a determination was made that the data and the requisite
model required is best categorized as TSCS analysis. Detailed discussions on group based
trajectory modeling (TRAJ) and a panel data analysis are discussed in Appendixes A and B
respectively. Briefly, TRAJ analysis is not an appropriate analysis for this study because the
testing of two specific dependent variables, as opposed to groups, is of importance in this study;
that is the proportion of the population following each group or the characteristics of groups are
not the focus of this analysis. Panel data analysis is not the most appropriate choice for several
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reasons, chief among them being that the specific Florida municipal police agencies themselves,
and not just a small sampling of municipal police agencies, are the focus of interest in this
analysis. A more detailed distinction between general panel data and TSCS data is discussed in
the Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis section as well as Appendix B.
Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis
At times within the literature, the terms panel data and TSCS data, the latter of which is a
type of panel data that requires TSCS specific handling, have been incorrectly referred to as if
they are one in the same. “Viewing panel data as a collection of n unit-specific time series or,
alternatively, as a collection of T cross-sections, explains why economists and political scientists
also call panel data pooled time-series cross-section (TSCS) data” (Andreß, Golsch, & Schmidt,
2013, p. 63). This can lead to confusion when distinguishing between panel data analysis and
TSCS analysis. As Beck (2001, p. 274) explains, “…much of the econometric literature
conflates [emphasis added] the analysis of panel data with the analysis of TSCS data, it is critical
to keep in mind the distinction between the two types of data.”
There are three key distinctions between panel data and TSCS data. First, as a general
rule, panel data has large numbers of cross-sections (big N) and few observed units (small T)
while TSCS has “reasonable sized T” and “not very large N” which will require some differences
in the treatment of the data (Beck, 2001). There is some debate as to what those size
qualifications of T and N should represent as a minimum and maximum number of actual T and
N observations. However, an analysis of political science studies published between 1995 and
2000 found a majority with TSCS datasets had a range of T from 10-40 and a range of N from
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20-400, which was slightly different than datasets published in economic studies which tended to
use even smaller T with larger N, on average, than political scientists (Adolph, Butler, & Wilson,
2005, p. 4).
Second, in the present study the units of analysis are Florida municipal police agencies
and these units of analysis are themselves of specific interest, unlike a smaller sample typically
used in panel data where the small sample itself is not the focus of interest, but rather the larger
population from which it was sampled. In TSCS analysis, Beck (2001, p. 273) refers to these
conceptual focal points as “inferences of interest.” The inferences of interest within this study
are derived from Florida municipal police agencies. This is consistent with TSCS data analysis
and not consistent with panel data analysis. This fine distinction between panel data and TSCS
data is reiterated by (Worrall & Pratt, 2004b, p. 84):
In the typical panel data set, the units are in themselves not the point of focus; rather, all
inferences of interest are left to the underlying population on which the sample is based.
In other words, inferences are not conditional on the sample. TSCS data are exactly the
opposite, where all inferences are conditional on the observed units. For example, it
would be difficult to conceive of sampling a ‘‘new’’ country, county, SMSA, or city of
the same name.
A third distinction that is made by Beck (2001, p. 273) is as follows: With panel data, the
small T does not justify contemplation of T →∞; however, “reasonable asymptotics in N,” or n
→∞ or n →N can be contemplated. With TSCS data a researcher can contemplate the possible
outcome of T →∞, which will be done in this analysis, based on the large-T data. Beck and Katz
(2001, p. 2) sum it up best:
This is to distinguish TSCS data from panel data. In particular, we have fixed, not
sampled, units, and all asymptotics are in T, not N; T is large enough to do some timeseries analysis on the data.
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Published articles discussing TSCS models typically exclude the constant term, or y
intercept, to simplify the notation (Adolph et al., 2005; Beck & Katz, 1995; Worrall & Pratt,
2004a). The Y intercept or α is omitted from the written equation, but is present as a parameter
in the actual statistical models, as explained by Beck and Katz (2004, p. 2), “we suppress the
constant term, which implies that the data have been centered; this is just to simplify notation for
the time series models.” Data is not typically centered for TSCS, nor has it been done for this
study, however the use of fixed effects modeling “is equivalent to unit centering all
observations” (Beck, 2008, p. 483). Fixed effects are almost always used for TSCS (Beck &
Katz, 1996), lending to the appropriateness of TSCS researchers typically omitting the constant
term. The basic bivariate TSCS model, with the y intercept suppressed is displayed in the
following form. Additional predictors can be added to create a multivariate TSCS model:

yit = βxit + εit; i =1,…, N; t =1,…, T,

(1)

where yit is the dependent variable (arrests or attrition) under study for agency i at year t, β
represents the coefficient for the independent variable (salary), xi,t is the independent variable
(salary) in the study and εit is the within-agency error.
There are two standard types of panel models available: fixed effect or random effect.
The two models differ in their approach to consider the unexplained variance in the police
department variable. The fixed effects model essentially eliminates this variance from the model
while the random effects model includes and estimates this variance. When choosing between
fixed effect or random effect model, in cases where a population is being analyzed as opposed to
a sample, a fixed effects model is recommended (Kennedy, 2003, p. 312). Under this model, the
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covariance between the city and time variables is eliminated by design. For TSCS, Beck and
Katz (1996, p. 4) state they do not use random effects, noting TSCS data almost always deals
with populations and not samples and explain, “they are not relevant in the TSCS case.”
In the present study, the entire population of Florida municipal police agencies within a
MSA, and not just a sampling of those agencies, is analyzed. With a fixed effects analysis, the
results are limited to the cross-section units used in the analysis. In situations where a sample is
used, such a limitation can be problematic; however in a population study such as this one, a
fixed effects analysis offers two distinct advantages: First it addresses heterogeneity in the data
set. Second it addresses omitted variable bias. A dummy variable for each unit (municipal
police agency) and each time point (year) is added to the basic TSCS model, except for the first
municipal police agency and first year to prevent perfect collinearity (Pindyck & Rubinfeld,
1991, pp. 224-226).
The fixed effects TSCS model can be displayed as:

yit = βxit + νi + κt + εit ; i =1,…, N; t =1,…, T

(2)

Where yit is the given dependent variable (arrests or attrition) under study for agency i at year t,

β represents the coefficient for the independent variable (salary), xit is the independent variable
(salary) in the study and νi is a dummy variable that controls for unmeasured, time-invariant
differences, between municipal agency differences. Then κt is a dummy variable that controls
for between municipal agency, time-invariant differences and εit is the within-agency error.
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The modeling of a dummy variable that controls for time-invariant, between city
differences addresses features one city may have, and others do not, that influence the dependent
variable being analyzed. The modeling of a dummy variable that controls time addresses events
common to all the cities in the analysis during any particular year. This will prevent
contamination of the X-Y relationship in the model by random year-to-year variations (Worrall
& Pratt, 2004a, p. 37). In a statistical model that revolves around municipal police officer
salaries, a downturn or uptick in the state-wide economy is perhaps the most likely threat a
dummy variable for time will address.
Testing for estimation issues or problems is important when conducting a TSCS analysis,
particularly for heterogeneity, temporal autocorrelation, panel heteroskedasticity, nonstationarity,
spatial autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a). Beck and
Katz (1996) point out that temporally correlated errors, spatially correlated errors and panel
heteroskedasticity are problems particular to TSCS and in the past, all had corrections based on
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) as described by Parks (1967). However, GLS cannot be used
when the number of units exceeds the number of time periods under analysis as the model is
unable to produce standard errors under such conditions (Beck, Katz, Alvarez, Garrett, & Lange,
1993). In addition, the correction for spatially correlated errors using GLS has been shown to
lead to bad estimates of standard errors (Beck & Katz, 1995). In the present study, with nearly
122 municipal police agencies (units) and only 11 annual data points (time) for each agency,
GLS is inappropriate. OLS regression with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) with a
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) is generally considered the standard recommended statistical

59

tool for analysis of TSCS data (Beck & Katz, 1996). This TSCS model can be displayed in the
following form:

yit = φyi,t - 1 + βxi,t + εi,t ; i =1,…, N; t =1,…, T

(3)

Where φyi,t -1 represents the dependent variable lagged by one year, β represents the coefficient
for the independent variable (salary), xi,t is the independent variable (salary) in the study and εit
is the error term.
OLS regression with PCSEs and a LDV will be used and the steps described in the
following section will be taken to address heterogeneity, temporal autocorrelation, panel
heteroskedasticity, nonstationarity, spatial autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation.
Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity refers to unobserved differences between or diversity among the units of
analysis which remain constant over time. For example, unit-specific characteristic such as
“rural” and “urban” vary among the cities in the analysis, but are characteristics that tend to
remain relatively stable over time (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a, p. 37). In the analysis of TSCS data,
the use of a fixed effects model is described by Beck (2008, p. 483) as the “simplest way” to
address this unit-to-unit mean and/or variance heterogeneity. A fixed effects TSCS model also
allows for a time-specific variable to capture the effect of events all cities in the analysis are
likely experience together, such as a downturn or upturn in the economy. For this reason a fixed
effects TSCS model will be used in this analysis.
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Temporal Autocorrelation
Temporal autocorrelation, also called serial correlation or serial dependence, refers to the
association between or dependence of the values from one unit in one time period to the same
unit from a different time period. It is anticipated that the independent variable salary will be
closely tied with one agency one year with the same agency during another year, or across time,
as police budgets are closely tied with one another over time (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a). The
modern and simple way to address temporal autocorrelation is through the use of LDVs (Beck,
2001, p. 279). This method, as modeled above, is used to address temporal autocorrelation as
long as the dependent variables are found to be stationary and the use of an LDV is theoretically
appropriate, as discussed later in the nonstationarity section.
Spatial Autocorrelation
Spatial Autocorrelation occurs when variable X at one location is correlated with variable
X at another location. This geographic clustering of observations occurs more frequently with
data sets that use populations, such as TSCS data sets, than data sets composed of randomly
sampled units (Mencken & Barnett, 1999). A “spatial effects model” with a new independent
variable created by averaging the “dependent variable on all contiguous units” (Worrall & Pratt,
2004a, p. 40) and adding it to the model will be used to control for spatial autocorrelation.
Contemporaneous Correlation
In the present study contemporaneous correlation refers to errors between two or more
units (cities) that occur at the same time (year) and are associated with one another, but not with
rest of the population. In describing contemporaneous correlations, Beck and Katz (1995, p.
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636) give the example of a cross-national study in which, “the economies of, say, the
Netherlands and Belgium are linked.” In the present study, while a downturn in the economy
may affect all cities in Florida at the same time, the effects on traditional tourist destination
cities such Orlando and Miami may be linked or associated more to each other than less
traditional tourist destination cities such as Jacksonville or Tallahassee.
A Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test should be conducted to test for
contemporaneous correlation. The LM test can be displayed in the following form:
ni

LM = Tr2ij
ij

(4)

Where i = one unit (agency) and j = another unit (agency) and “r2 is the ijth residual correlation
coefficient” (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a, p. 40). The null hypothesis of this test states there is no
correlation between the residuals of one municipal police department to other municipal police
departments in the same year. In other words, the null hypothesis states there is no
contemporaneous correlation or no panel effect (Certo & Semandeni, 2006, p. 452). If an
analysis of the data determines the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, simple OLS regression
will be appropriate for this analysis. If an analysis of the data determines the null hypothesis
should be rejected, the LM test can be viewed as being “decisive that there are individual
effects” (Greene, 2003, p. 303) and PCSEs will be used to correct the problem of
contemporaneous correlation by offering the most accurate coefficient estimates available.
Research has reinforced the use of PCSEs in combination with a LDV for TSCS analysis
in most cases (Beck, 2008; Beck & Katz, 2004; Keele & Kelly, 2006). PCSEs address
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contemporaneous correlation by allowing the correlation to vary between units, something the
oversimplified OLS model does not offer (Beck, 2008). When a researcher only relies on
dummy variables for each time period when using OLS , an assumption is made the correlation
is the same among all the municipal agencies at each time point, but PCSEs allow for this
correlation to vary which in turn allows the model to provide “more accurate coefficient
estimates” (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a, p. 45).
Panel Heteroskedasticity
Panel heteroskedasticity is a subtype of heteroskedasticity that is commonly found in
panel and TSCS data where error variances or residuals across units are required to be constant,
but violate this assumption by varying from unit to unit, often due to a time dependency (Worrall
& Pratt, 2004a, p. 38). To address this time dependency of the residuals, PCSEs allow for serial
correlation to vary from unit to unit (Beck & Katz, 1996, p. 7). The PCSE method itself is
critiqued for violating the Gauss-Markov assumption that residual variance is constant among all
predictors, but as pointed out by Beck (2007) addressing the method’s critics, PCSEs are used to
correct an existing violation of the Gauss-Markov assumptions and when used for TSCS data,
PCSEs provide the best estimation among all other available correction methods, to include
GLS. Beck and Katz (1995, p. 637) point out, “correction for contemporaneous correlations of
the errors automatically corrects for any panel heteroskedasticity.” In the present study PCSEs
are used to correct for contemporaneous correlation which in turn also correct panel
heteroskedasticity by allowing for some variance within units.
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Nonstationarity
Stationarity is a statistical assumption of TSCS analysis that the data do not vary, “simply
as a function of time” (Beck & Katz, 2011, p. 333). Providing a hypothetical scenario in an
attempt to explain stationarity, Worrall and Pratt (2004a, p. 39) explain:
It is well-known, for instance, that crime rates fluctuate over time. That is, they trend
upward and downward over the long haul. Time series analysis assumes that this is not
the case, which means that the data need to be forcibly made stationary.
When working with TSCS the dependent variable must be tested for stationarity prior to
using OLS with a LDV, which should only be used with stationary dependent variables (Keele
& Kelly, 2006, p. 203). Stationarity in the dependent variable can be identified with the use of a
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) unit root test (ADF). The null hypothesis states the variable
being tested has a unit root and is therefore nonstationary (Hamilton, 1994). If the null
hypothesis can be rejected, the tested dependent variable is stationary and an LDV can be used.
If not, techniques for co-integrated data must be used to control for problems associated with
nonstationary dependent variables (Keele & Kelly, 2006).
If the dependent variables in the present study (attrition and arrests) are found to be
nonstationary, the first differences method will be used to forcibly make the data stationary and
useful for TSCS analysis (Beck & Katz, 1996; Podestà, 2006). Nonstationarity must be tested
against both dependent variables as it is an assumption of TSCS analysis. Similar to crime
rates, Part II arrests may trend up or down over the long term and might not be nonstationary.
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Plan of the Analysis
For the first step in the analysis, an LM test will be conducted to identify
contemporaneous correlation and/or panel heteroskedasticity. The results of this test will
determine if PCSEs or simple OLS regression will be used for each dependent variable. The LM
will be followed by an LLC test which will identify whether or not the data has a unit root. If
any of the dependent variables are found to have unit roots, they will be transformed using first
differences. Each dependent variable will then be analyzed separately using either PCSE with a
LDV or simple OLS. The first regression model for each will include year and city variables.
Then a second model will be run using all of the control variables in the first model, but adding
control variables for spatial effects. An analysis of a third model will then be conducted to
include Florida municipal police agencies located within a Micropolitan Statistical Area, adding
those agencies to the Florida municipal police agencies located within an MSA. The results of
this third model will be included in a side by side table for a comparative analysis. Finally a
fourth model that includes only year 2008 data, the first year of a four year recession in Florida,
will be run. The results of this analysis will be placed in tables adjacent to the 2001-2011 years’
analysis results for comparison. All 4 models will be run for each dependent variables attrition
and arrests for a total of 8 models. Statistical program STATA 13 will be used for the statistical
analysis.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS

To determine whether simple OLS regression could be used, a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) test was conducted for both dependent variables. The null hypothesis of this test
is that there is no serial correlation in the data. In other words, the test assumes error terms
between two or more cities are never associated with one another, at the same time, separate
from the rest of the population. The null hypothesis was rejected for the dependent variables
attrition and arrests, indicating the presence of contemporaneous correlation and/or
heteroskedasticity. For arrests, the LM test produced a x2 value of 5694.91 with a significance
of p = 0.000. For attrition, the LM test produced a x2 value of 324.7 with a significance of p =
0.000. As a result, the use of simple OLS regression is not appropriate for attrition and arrests
and PCSEs is more appropriate.
In order to evaluate the assumption that dependent variables are stationary in a timeseries analysis, an ADF unit root test is typically conducted (Worrall & Pratt, 2004a). Because
this study contains both time series and cross sectional data a more advanced TSCS type ADF
based analysis is required. The Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) unit root test, often suggested for TSCS
data, is not appropriate for this particular data set as it is recommended to only be used when
“25-250” time series observations are available per unit (Levin, Lin, & James Chu, 2002, p. 3).
Instead, the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IMP) unit root test has been shown in Monte Carlo results to
perform well with a small T and is more appropriate for this study where T = 11 (Im, Pesaran, &
Shin, 2003, p. 69).
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The IMP test reports a W-t-bar statistic that can be explained as “the average of the tstatistics from individual ADF regressions” (Levin et al., 2002, p. 9) within the TSCS data. The
IMP unit root test was conducted for the study’s dependent variables. For both attrition and
arrests, the IMP unit root tests both rejected the null hypothesis. For attrition, the W-t-bar
statistic is -3.4136 at 3 lags with p = .0003. For attrition, the W-t-bar statistic is -2.9219 at 3 lags
with p = .0017. The null hypothesis states all panels contain unit roots and all are nonstationary.
After rejecting the null hypothesis, an assumption must be made that all of the panels for
variables attrition and arrests, do not vary, in part, as a function of time (Beck & Katz, 2011).
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and control variables.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Dependent Variables
UCR Part II Arrests per Officer
Officer Attrition Rate
Independent Variables
Officer Salary as a Z Score
Officer Salary as a Z Score (t-1)
Control Variables
UCR Part II Arrests per Officer (t-1)
Officer Attrition Rate (t-1)
0
Take Home Car Program
Local Pension
State Pension
DROP Retirement Program
Annual Part I Crimes
Officers per 1,000 Residents
Total Sworn Officers
Annual Vacation Hours
Annual Sick Hours
Annual Paid Holidays
Life Insurance - Fully Subsidized
Life Insurance - Partially Subsidized
Health Insurance - Fully Subsidized
Health Insurance - Partially Subsidized
Dental Insurance - Fully Subsidized
Dental Insurance - Partially Subsidized
Disability Insurance - Fully Subsidized
Disability Insurance - Partially

Mean

SD

Min.

Max.

16.958
.119

11.626
.114

.060
.000

91
1.300

.187
.187

.903
.903

-3.922
-3.922

3.202
3.202

16.954
.122
.640
.760
.210
.670
1997.500
3.177
81.900
89.340
87.730
10.370
.840
.100
.770
.170
.400
.280
.430
.180

11.526
.118
.479
.427
.410
.470
3740.699
3.145
131.343
34.117
32.791
1.951
.371
.300
.423
.380
.490
.448
.495
.387

.060
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
5.000
1.065
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

91
1.300
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
35380.000
42.403
1002
240
480
16
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Subsidized
Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) are used in the final model as this method is the
best known way to address panel heteroskedasticity in TSCS data (Beck & Katz, 1995). PCSEs
are employed with both city and year dummy variables, less the first city dummy variable and
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the first year dummy variable to prevent collinearity. The preferred use of a LDV to address any
temporal autocorrelation for both of the dependent variables is employed (Beck, 2001). The
final model also includes spatial effects control variables for each city.
There were strong, positive Pearson correlations between UCR part II arrests per officer
and UCR part II arrests per officer lagged by one year (0.851, p<0.01), officer salary as a z score
and officer salary as a z score lagged by one year (0.859, p<0.01). There were high levels of
significant negative Pearson correlation between, local pension and state pension (-0.928,
p<0.01) life insurance fully subsidized and life insurance partially subsidized (-0.750, p<0.01)
and health insurance fully subsidized and health insurance partially subsidized (-0.833, p<0.01).
Positive, but weaker Pearson correlations were found between UCR part II arrests per officer and
annual part I crimes (0.124, p<0.01), dental insurance fully subsidized and health insurance fully
subsidized (0.403, p<0.01) and dental insurance partially subsidized and health insurance
partially subsidized (0.330, p<0.01). Dental insurance fully subsidized and health insurance
partially subsidized presented low levels of negative correlations (-0.339, p<0.01) as did dental
insurance partially subsidized and health insurance fully subsidized (-0.288, p<0.01).
An uncentered Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) test was also run for both the arrests and
attrition models. As a general rule, a VIF of 10 or more is considered excessive collinearity in a
regression model (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006; Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Neter,
2004). For the arrests model, several city control variables and the following displayed a VIF
>10: Local pension (504.87), annual paid holidays (87.75), state pension (71.71), average part II
arrests per officer within county (36.06), annual sick hours (30.97), annual part I crime (28.33),
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health insurance fully subsidized (26.84), life insurance fully subsidized (22.29), annual vacation
hours (20.07), officers per 1,000 residents (18.11), UCR part II arrests per officer (t-1) (11.86),
and DROP retirement program (10.73). For the attrition model, local pension (587.94), annual
paid holidays (89.69), state pension (75.66), officers per 1,000 residents (27.99), health insurance
fully subsidized (26.77), life insurance fully subsidized (22.29), annual vacation hours (20.16),
and DROP retirement program (10.83) all displayed a VIF > 10. Exploratory Factor Analysis
(EFA) was attempted, but only the continuous variables could be used as it is a required
assumption of the technique (Bollen, 2014; Flora & Curran, 2004).
For the EFA of the attrition model variables, officer salary as a z score (0.929), officer
salary as a z score lagged by one year (0.927), and total sworn officers (0.550) grouped together
as component 1. This component had a Chronbach’s alpha of (0.014). The two salary variables
measure the same thing, at different times, but total sworn officers does not have the same shared
meaning. Spatial officer attrition rate (0.873), officer attrition rate (0.836), and officer attrition
rate (t-1) (0.510) represented component 2 with a Chronbach’s alpha of (0.627). All three
measure a similar construct. Annual paid holidays (0.699), annual vacation hours (-0.684), and
officers per 1,000 residents (0.511) combined for component 3. It had a Chronbach’s alpha test
score of (-0.061). While paid holiday and vacation hours have a similar conceptual meaning,
variable officers per 1,000 residents does not appear to measure the same construct. The
Chronbach’s alpha test for each exploratory component in the attrition model fell below the
standard of α > 0.70. Taking all of these issues into consideration, none of the variables were
combined into a new factor.
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For the EFA of the arrests model variables, UCR part II arrests per officer (t-1) (0.865)
and spatial UCR part II arrests per officer (0.856) represented component 1 with a Chronbach’s
alpha of (0.582). Officer salary as a z score (0.933), officer salary as a z score lagged by one
year (0.932), and annual part I crimes (0.550) grouped together as component 2. This component
had a Chronbach’s alpha of (0.000). The salary variables measure the same construct, at
different time points, but annual part I crimes does not have a shared meaning. Annual vacation
hours (-0.760), annual paid holidays (0.644), and officers per 1,000 residents (0.487) combined
for component 3 with a Chronbach’s alpha test score of (-0.061). Variable officers per 1,000
residents does not appear to share a conceptual meaning with annual vacation hours and annual
paid holidays. In the arrests model, the Chronbach’s alpha test results were less than the
standard of α > 0.70. In sum, these arrest model independent and control variables do not appear
to warrant combining them into new factors.
Because EFA and alphas demonstrated grouping the variables into a scale was not a
viable option, those adding unacceptably high multicollinearity were removed from their
respective models. A stepwise process was utilized removing the highest VIF variable one at a
time, beginning with local pension and working progressively downwards to the lowest scoring
item as done successfully by other TSCS analysis researchers (Nair & Kotha, 2001; Pickering &
Kisangani, 2005). During this removal process, all of the high VIF city controls in the arrests
model fell below 10 and remained in the analysis; however all of the other high VIF, non-city
variables listed above were eventually removed. The same held true for the attrition model. All
of the city controls fell below a VIF < 10 during the stepwise process while the high VIF, noncity variables did not and were removed.
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TSCS analyses often produce very high R2 values as, over time, the variables within these
models tend to move together. The identification of variables that contribute to the models is the
focus of this study, not the overall R2. The actual value of each model’s R2 is reported, but is of
limited value to this study’s research questions. The results can be seen in tables 3 through 8
reported with the unstandardized coefficients (B) and the standard errors of the regression (SE).
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Table 3
Determinants of Part II Arrests per Officer at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-2011
Independent Variable

B

SE

Officer Salary

-.285

.422

Officer Salary (t-1)

-.441

.407

Take Home Program

-.622

.640

Life Insurance Partial

.430

.557

Health Insurance Partial

-.242

.453

1.514*

.652

Dental Insurance Partial

.717

.552

Disability Insurance Full

-.670

.540

Disability Insurance Partial

-.699

.614

Year 2002

.570***

.130

Year 2003

1.824***

.092

Year 2004

1.225***

.071

Year 2005

1.918***

.069

Year 2006

1.723***

.080

Year 2007

1.497***

.066

Year 2008

1.070***

.071

Dental Insurance Full

(table continues)
Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. The 121 city control variables, many of which are significant, are not
listed for brevity. N = 1342 †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Independent Variable

B

SE

Year 2009

-.276

.190

Year 2010

.703**

.210

Year 2011

.039

.095

Model R2

.718***

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. The 121 city control variables, many of which are significant, are not
listed for brevity. N = 1342 †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001

Officer salary failed to provide a significant, individual contribution to the model. This
outcome fails to reject the null arrests hypothesis, H0 = A municipal police agency’s pay scale
falling behind other regional municipal police agencies does not lead to decreased work input.
A strong cultural belief among police that “law enforcement is their most important
responsibility” (Paoline et al., 2000, p. 589) may contribute to officers’ decision not to reduce
their individual rates of discretionary arrests, even when underpaid. Unlike a factory worker
who likely sees his or her work input solely benefiting the employer, an officer’s view of police
work as a “calling” (Cooper, 2012, p. 174) to help the greater good may be too powerful to
change his or her normal work inputs in an effort to off-set a stagnant or falling wage.
It is important to note that while employees’ efforts to reduce their work inputs is one of
the response options equity theory says an underpaid officer might take, it is not mandatory to
find support for it. In tests of equity theory, not all employees react the same way and some
simply quit without any sign of decline in their work inputs (Valenzi & Andrews, 1971). In
some cases equity theory was supported when underpaid employees actually performed slightly
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better than their overpaid peers, but instead displayed a higher propensity to quit their jobs (Finn
& Lee, 1972). In summary, this failure to reject the null hypothesis related to work inputs by
underpaid officers does not amount to disproving of the value of equity theory in criminal justice
research. Instead it shifts the focus to attrition as a test of equity theory and may be a
commentary of officers’ cultural views of their obligations to conduct discretionary arrests. The
equity theory arrests hypothesis is not confirmed with this Florida TSCS data set: Hypothesis 1
(H1): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional municipal police
agencies leads to decreased work input.
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Table 4
Determinants of Officer Attrition at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-2011
Independent Variable

B

SE

Officer Attrition (t-1)

-.030

.073

Officer Salary

-.648

.628

-1.181*

.592

Take Home Program

-.403

.750

Life Insurance Partial

-.568

.762

Health Insurance Partial

-.169

.594

Dental Insurance Full

-.162

.751

Dental Insurance Partial

-.169

.671

Disability Insurance Full

-.692

.567

Disability Insurance Partial

-1.055

.682

Year 2002

-.109

.170

Year 2003

-.123

.135

Year 2004

.054

.128

Year 2005

-.052

.097

Year 2006

-.075

.141

Year 2007

-.161

.115

Officer Salary (t-1)

(table continues)
Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. The 121 city control variables, many of which are significant, are not
listed for brevity. N = 1342 †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Independent Variable

B

SE

Year 2008

-.089

.111

Year 2009

-.029

.284

Year 2010

-.031

.448

Year 2011

-.149

.423

Spatial Attrition

.991***

.005

Model R2

.572***

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. The 121 city control variables, many of which are significant, are not
listed for brevity. N = 1342 †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001

The inclusion of a take home car program, partially subsidized life or health insurance, or
any type of dental coverage did not significantly influence officer attrition at the p < .05 level.
Attrition (t-1), salary and the years 2002-2011 were not significant as well. However, salary (t –
1) and within county spatial trends demonstrated significant negative and positive relationships
respectively.
While salary did not influence attrition, salary (t-1) was significant with a -1.181
unstandardized coefficient (p < .05). Stated differently, for each one z-score unit an agency’s
previous year’s officer salary falls below the MSA regional average officer salary, annual sworn
attrition rate is estimated to be increased by 1.181% points at the 95% confidence level. The
1.181% is an unstandardized coefficient that represents the percentage of all sworn officers at an
agency. This finding supports the hypothesis that a municipal police agency’s pay scale falling
behind other regional municipal police agencies leads to increased attrition. This outcome
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allows for the rejection of the null attrition hypothesis, H0 = A municipal police agency’s pay
scale falling behind other regional municipal police agencies does not lead to increased
attrition.
This is consistent with the prior literature in equity theory that quitting is one type of
response employees’ display in response to an inequitable salary (Austin & Walster, 1974; Finn
& Lee, 1972; Valenzi & Andrews, 1971). This finding is also consistent with the behaviors of
New Jersey police officers who displayed a negative response, delayed by months, after losing
salary disputes at final arbitration (Mas, 2006). The increased attrition rate fits with prior
research among Vermont municipal police officers who cited salary and benefits as the two most
important reasons they voluntarily left an agency (McIntyre, 1990). The alternative attrition
hypothesis is confirmed here: Hypothesis 2 (H2): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling
behind other regional municipal police agencies leads to increased attrition.
Although most of Florida is composed of counties located within Metropolitan Statistical
Areas, there are seven Micropolitan Statistical Areas within the state. Within those seven
Micropolitan Statistical Areas there were twelve municipal police departments, of which seven
agencies had no missing data points or strongly balanced data. Those seven cities were added to
the analysis and the analysis was re-run for each of the three dependent variables. The results of
these analyses can be seen on the following pages in Tables 5 and 6:
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Table 5
Determinants of Part II Arrests per Officer at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-2011
Independent Variable

MSAs Only

MSAs and Micropolitans

B

SE

B

SE

Officer Salary

-.285

.422

-.225

.461

Officer Salary (t-1)

-.441

.407

-.184

.449

Take Home Program

-.622

.640

-.350

.635

Life Insurance Partial

.430

.557

.506

.563

Health Insurance Partial

-.242

.453

-.345

457

1.514*

.652

.845

.622

Dental Insurance Partial

.717

.552

.261

.523

Disability Insurance Full

-.670

.540

-.732

.557

Disability Insurance Partial

-.699

.614

-.869

.674

Year 2002

.570***

.130

.567***

.157

Year 2003

1.824***

.092

1.942***

.116

Year 2004

1.225***

.071

1.161***

.097

Year 2005

1.918***

.069

2.300***

.099

Year 2006

1.723***

.080

2.018***

.091

Year 2007

1.497***

.066

1.488***

.101

Year 2008

1.070***

.071

.900***

.081

Dental Insurance Full

(table continues)
Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. 121 city variables not listed, some significant, for brevity. MSA
Only, N = 1342. MSAs and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, N = 1418. †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Independent Variable

MSAs Only

MSAs and Micropolitans

B

SE

B

SE

Year 2009

-.276

.190

.016

.203

Year 2010

.703**

.210

.394†

.222

Year 2011

.039

.095

-.042

.107

Model R2

.718***

.707***

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. 121 city variables, some significant, not listed for brevity. MSA
Only, N = 1342. MSAs and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, N = 1418. †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Table 6
Determinants of Officer Attrition at Florida Municipal Police Agencies, 2001-2011
Independent Variable

MSAs Only

MSAs and Micropolitans

B

SE

B

SE

Officer Attrition (t-1)

-.030

.073

-.028

.066

Officer Salary

-.648

.628

-.654

.622

-1.181*

.592

-1.126†

.592

Take Home Program

-.403

.750

-.396

.731

Life Insurance Partial

-.568

.762

-.551

.778

Health Insurance Partial

-.169

.594

-.112

.558

Dental Insurance Full

-.162

.751

-.071

.725

Dental Insurance Partial

-.169

.671

-.129

.652

Disability Insurance Full

-.692

.567

-.620

.562

Disability Insurance Partial

-1.055

.682

-1.000

.669

Year 2002

-.109

.170

-.068

.163

Year 2003

-.123

.135

-.065

.120

Year 2004

.054

.128

.055

.111

Year 2005

-.052

.097

-.058

.105

Year 2006

-.075

.141

-.097

.126

Year 2007

-.161

.115

-.162

.112

Officer Salary (t-1)

(table continues)
Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. 121 city variables, some significant, not listed for brevity. MSA
Only, N = 1342. MSAs and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, N = 1418. †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Independent Variable

MSAs Only

MSAs and Micropolitans

B

SE

B

SE

Year 2008

-.089

.111

-.103

.111

Year 2009

-.029

.284

-.004

.266

Year 2010

-.031

.448

-.011

.413

Year 2011

-.149

.423

-.161

.395

Spatial Attrition

.991***

.005

.992***

.005

Model R2

.572***

.602***

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. 121 city variables, some significant, not listed for brevity. MSA
Only, N = 1342. MSAs and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, N = 1418. †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001

After the addition of Micropolitan agencies to the arrests model, salary and salary (t-1)
continued to have no significance. However, the inclusion of the Micropolitan law enforcement
agencies in the attrition model changed the salary (t-1) significance from the p < .05 level to p <
.10. To further explore this change, a panel regression model for attrition consisting of data only
from the additional Micropolitan agencies for the same 2001-2011 years was run. It found no
statistical significance for salary or salary (t-1) on attrition. This may explain the change.
In 2008, the U.S. and Florida plunged into an economic recession (Bowley & Norris,
2008). To test how this may have affected the analysis, a regression model with only 2008 year
data, to include the one year lagged independent variables previously used, was calculated and
compared to the larger 2001-2011 data set for both of the dependent variables; arrests and
attrition. The following tables present the information for comparison using the final models for
each dependent variable described in the above sections.
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Table 7
2008 Only Regression for Agency Part II Arrests per Officer versus 2001-2011
Independent Variable

2008

2001-2011

B

SE

B

SE

Officer Salary

-4.529

2.900

-.285

.422

Officer Salary (t-1)

3.965

2.908

-.441

.407

Take Home Program

3.955

2.682

-.622

.640

Life Insurance Partial

-1.835

3.539

.430

.557

Health Insurance Partial

.313

2.962

-.242

.453

Dental Insurance Full

3.578

2.863

1.514*

.652

Dental Insurance Partial

7.646

3.231*

.717

.552

Disability Insurance Full

-2.770

2.645

-.670

.540

Disability Insurance Partial

-5.502

3.550

-.699

.614

Year 2002

N/A

N/A

.570***

.130

Year 2003

N/A

N/A

1.824***

.092

Year 2004

N/A

N/A

1.225***

.071

Year 2005

N/A

N/A

1.918***

.069

Year 2006

N/A

N/A

1.723***

.080

Year 2007

N/A

N/A

1.497***

.066

Year 2008

N/A

N/A

-.276

.190
(table continues)

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. For 2008 only, N = 122. For 2001-2011, N = 1342. 121 city control
variables, some significant, not listed for brevity. †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Independent Variable

2008

2001-2011

B

SE

B

SE

Year 2009

N/A

N/A

-.276

.190

Year 2010

N/A

N/A

.703**

.210

Year 2011

N/A

N/A

.039

.095

Model R2

.102

.718***

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. For 2008 only, N = 122. For 2001-2011, N = 1342. 121 city control
variables, some significant, not listed for brevity. †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Table 8
2008 Only Regression for Officer Attrition versus 2001-2011
Independent Variable

2008

2001-2011

B

SE

B

SE

Officer Attrition (t-1)

.222

.060

-.030

.073

Officer Salary

.928

1.575

-.648

.628

Officer Salary (t-1)

-2.425

1.568

-1.181*

.592

Take Home Program

2.691

1.449

-.403

.750

Life Insurance Partial

.730

1.920

-.568

.762

Health Insurance Partial

.189

1.604

-.169

.594

Dental Insurance Full

.147

1.546

-.162

.751

Dental Insurance Partial

.571

1.742

-.169

.671

Disability Insurance Full

-.011

1.466

-.692

.567

Disability Insurance Partial

-.832

1.954

-1.055

.682

Year 2002

N/A

N/A

-.109

.170

Year 2003

N/A

N/A

-.123

.135

Year 2004

N/A

N/A

.054

.128

Year 2005

N/A

N/A

-.052

.097

Year 2006

N/A

N/A

-.075

.141

Year 2007

N/A

N/A

-.161

.115

(table continues)
Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. For 2008 only, N = 122. For 2001-2011, N = 1342. 121 city control
variables, some significant, not listed for brevity. †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Independent Variable

2008

2001-2011

B

SE

B

SE

Year 2008

N/A

N/A

-.103

.111

Year 2009

N/A

N/A

-.004

.266

Year 2010

N/A

N/A

-.011

.413

Year 2011

N/A

N/A

-.161

.395

Spatial Attrition

.895

.121***

.992***

.005

Model R2

.484***

.602***

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. For 2008 only, N = 122. For 2001-2011, N = 1342. 121 city control
variables, some significant, not listed for brevity. †p < .10 *p < .05; **p < .01 ***p < .00

Perhaps not surprisingly, the 2008-only analysis differed from the 2001-2011 analysis.
Of note, salary (t-1) was not significant for the 2008-only attrition model. Meanwhile the 20012011 analysis found officer salary (t-1) provided a significant, negative influence on attrition at
the p < .05 level. An unexpected relationship change was found in the arrests model as control
variable fully subsidized dental insurance was no longer significant for arrests. However,
partially subsidized dental insurance became significant for arrests at 7.646 at the p < .05 level.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

According to Adams’ (1963, 1965) equity theory, employees and employers participate
in an exchange relationship with one another and desire fairness and balance. This exchange
relationship consists of inputs and outcomes. Inputs from a police employee include work
product, such as arrests, while outcomes for a police officer would include salary. Equity theory
anticipates underpaid employees will produce less work input for their employer and/or quit their
job when they feel under compensated (Walster et al., 1978). The following hypotheses were
used to test equity theory in this study:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional
municipal police agencies leads to decreased work input.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): A municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional
municipal police agencies leads to increased attrition.
This study has potential applicability to the policing literature as it tests a wellestablished industrial organizational theory in a law enforcement context, with a large, TSCS
data set. It is also an attempt to prevent the criminal justice field from “missing out” on an
important theory found in another discipline (Cooper & Worrall, 2012, p. 387). This testing
using TSCS data sets is uncommon and considered by some researchers to be the best way to test
equity theory (Cosier & Dalton, 1983; Mitchell & James, 2001).
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Policing: Theory Implications
This study attempted to add to the existing literature on policing by testing equity theory
using a law enforcement specific data set to determine its potential value to criminal justice
research. This testing was influenced by calls by criminal justice researchers for more theory in
policing (Cooper & Worrall, 2012; Mastrofski, 2004; Mears, 2010). The results indicate equity
theory has potential to explain agency level impacts police departments experience when their
starting salaries vary significantly from others in their region. Within this data set of Florida
municipal police agencies for the years 2001-2011, salary influences attrition, but not work
inputs per officer, operationalized by arrests. The overall conclusion drawn from the analysis
results is that equity theory explains a significant portion of police officer attrition rates
experienced at the department level at municipal law enforcement agencies in Florida found in
this 122 city data set.
While equity theory has been tested extensively in the industrial organizational literature
(Mowday, 1987) and has been referenced in policing literature to explain outcomes (Mas, 2004b;
McIntyre, 1990), within the policing research it has never before been the exclusive testing focus
for agency level outcomes. While this study has found support of equity theory with a
longitudinal criminal justice data set, to add value and clarity to the policing literature it should
be empirically tested multiple times within the field of study (Hay, 2001). Using data sets from
other parts of the country, from different time periods and testing of additional work input
variables could help bolster, or dispute, the support for equity theory found in this study.
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It is possible that the lack of significance between salary and work inputs, measured by
variable arrests in this study, might not be a reflection of a lack of support for equity theory, but
rather could be attributable to modeling and measurement shortcomings. The greatest threats to
statistical conclusion validity in this study include unreliability of measures and unreliability of
treatment implementation (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 45). If unreliability of
measures is responsible for the lack of significance, it is possible officers are reducing their work
inputs when their salaries fall, but they may simply be doing it other ways. For example, they
may reduce the number of non-criminal traffic citations they issue, the number of miles they
drive for proactive patrol or the amount of effort they put into follow up investigations all while
continuing to maintain their individual rates of discretionary arrest inputs. The risk from
unreliability of treatment application for arrests is most likely to arise from inconsistencies in a
department’s style of policing (Perrow, 1967; Wilson, 1968) from one study agency to the next.
The finding of significance for police officer attrition as a response to falling salaries was
anticipated. The finding of no change in UCR part II arrests per officer in response to falling
salaries was not initially anticipated as a response predicted by equity theory. It is important to
note some researchers have found employee attrition without any reduction in work input as the
equity response to the underpaid condition (Valenzi & Andrews, 1971). Within the Florida
municipal police agencies studied in this analysis during the years 2001-2011, police
departments that offered salaries lower than their regional average experienced higher officer
attrition rates.
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The lack of a change in arrests per officer for minor crimes, Part II offenses, may indicate
officers’ arrest work is primarily driven by other, more influential factors and on average it is not
driven by salary. Officer role adaptation, in which officers generally fall into individual arrest
behavior patterns of zero, low, medium and high annual arrests rates, as studied by W. F. Walsh
(1986), may be more influential. It also may be that most officers feel the profession is a calling
that instills a sense of obligation to make an arrest when needed and any feelings of a need to
balance pay inequity are not strong enough to override that sense of obligation to arrest when
they feel it is appropriate, even for minor crimes. This finding, if supported by further testing in
other regions, agencies and years, could be considered an “occupational culture” level
contribution to the study of policing when viewed as a “filtering process” model, as suggested by
Paoline (2003, p. 209).
Police Management: Policy and Practice Implications
All managers of police agencies whether a commissioner, police chief, mayor, city
manager, city council member or similar position regularly must decide what is an appropriate
starting salary to pay officers in their municipality. There is scant research available to explain
the outcomes of their choice of police salaries to draw insight from when making these decisions,
yet they are made routinely, in every city. This research should help provide a foundation for
understanding of what might happen if municipal police officer starting salaries fall behind the
regional average within their respective MSA.
The results of the present study indicate salary, lagged by one year, appeared to influence
attrition among Florida municipal police officers in the direction expected in this analysis, but
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displayed no significant relationship to arrests. At municipal police agencies in Florida, as
officer starting salaries fall behind the regional average, defined by the agency’s MSA, officer
attrition is likely to increase, but work inputs, measured by discretionary UCR part II arrests per
officer, are unlikely to change. The opposite is likely true if an agency offers a starting officer
salary higher than the regional average. For every one standard deviation above the previous
year’s regional average starting salary offered, a municipal law enforcement agency is likely to
experience less officer attrition equaling approximately 1.2% points of its total sworn strength.
This is approximately 10% of the mean Florida municipal agency attrition rate. An increase in
salary is anticipated to have no change in arrests per officer experienced by the agency.
When municipal police agencies located within the less populated Micropolitan
Statistical Areas within Florida were added to the analysis, the results found the same negative
relationship between salary lagged one year and a slightly lower rate of approximately 1.1%
points decrease in attrition for each standard deviation of pay greater than the regional average.
The inclusion of the Micropolitan areas also leads to a less robust significance at the p < .10 level
as opposed to previous p < .05 level. Those same agencies are also anticipated to experience no
change in the largely discretionary, UCR part II arrests per officer their agency experiences. As
it was outside the scope of this study, it is unknown whether or not very rural municipal police
agencies located within Florida, but outside of a Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Area,
will experience any change in officer attrition or a change in the number of UCR part II arrests
conducted per officer as a result of low or falling salaries.

91

At Florida municipalities, knowing attrition will increase by approximately 1.2% of the
overall sworn strength annually overall for each standard deviation police officer starting salaries
fall below the mean regional average has some practical value. This should allow police
managers to better anticipate additional costs not otherwise obvious in a decision to allow
starting salaries to fall or remain stagnant. Hiring, outfitting and training new officers to replace
those who quit have an associated cost and that cost should be subtracted from anticipated
savings anticipated from reducing or holding salaries flat. This should lead to a more accurate
budgeting as it relates to police officer salaries.
The second important policy and practice implication is the lack of an effect of a lower
starting salary on mostly discretionary, UCR Part II arrests. The news is good for police
managers. Officers do not appear to reduce this type of work input for their employing agency
when their salaries fall or are stagnant behind those of their regional counterparts. Because of
this, it does not appear Florida municipal police agencies need to devote any more resources than
normal to monitoring discretionary arrest rates per officer if salaries fall behind regional
counterparts.
For municipal police agencies within MSAs, spatial effects suffered from high
multicolinearity within the model for officer arrests with an uncentered VIF of 11.86. Because it
had VIF > 10 it was considered too high and removed from the analysis (Hair et al., 2006;
Kutner et al., 2004). However, for attrition, a substantially large spatial effect was observed with
an unstandardized correlation coefficient of .991 at the p < .001 level. The presence of within
county spatial effects is important for the applied professional. If other in-county municipal
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agencies experience a change in attrition, a police or city manager can anticipate their municipal
police agency will be more likely to experience a similar change.
The lack of observed significance between UCR part II arrests and officer salary was
unexpected, but not outside the scope of the equity theory literature. Previous research has
shown police officers in New Jersey conducted fewer overall arrests for their agencies after
losing final offer arbitration hearings for salary negotiations (Mas, 2004a). However, after
further consideration, the circumstances are not entirely equivalent. The loss of final offer
arbitration includes emotional buildup and anticipation of improved wages and/or benefits. Mas
(2004b) found the less an arbitration offer was anticipated to win, the less the total number
negative outcomes experienced by a police agency, including how far agency arrests fell. At
agencies that fall behind in pay, on average, the process is likely gradual and without the sudden
loss experienced with a single, final offer arbitration ruling. This may be why officers at Florida
municipal police agencies were not found to react to flat or falling salaries with a response of
conducting fewer UCR part II arrests.
Another potential explanation for the absence of an effect of salary on arrests is that
police officer arrest rates are resilient to change. In the well-known Kansas City Preventive City
Patrol Experiment (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974), arrest rates were unchanged even
when drastic restrictions were placed on officer patrol patterns. Research has also shown that
most officers find law enforcement to be an important responsibility and find most officers
believe good police work coincides with patrolling aggressively (Paoline et al., 2000). Even Mas
(2006) found dips in agency arrest rates after a loss at final offer arbitration disappeared after 22
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months. At the end of the day, officers may view making arrests as an obligation and unlike a
factory worker withholding quantity or quality of items produced, it appears municipal police
officers in Florida simply do not respond to pay inequity in an employer-employee relationship
by withholding this type of work input.
This is where the application of equity theory can add value to policing research. Officer
salary data is available for all municipal, county and state law enforcement officers in Florida
through the annual CJAP. The LEMAS survey offers salary information for officers every three
to four years for all state and local law enforcement agencies employing 100 or more officers
plus a sampling of all smaller departments. One would also anticipate that most law enforcement
agencies that are proactively cooperating with a research study will also make salary data readily
available. Equity theory can help explain a portion of officer attrition and can be used as a
control variable allowing for more detailed analysis of other potential police attrition predictors.
Limitations
The present study generalizations may be limited to Florida municipal police agencies as
only data from Florida municipal police agencies were used in the analysis. While MSAs and
Micros may be inclusive of the bulk of municipal police agency recruiting, they are not inclusive
of all police recruiting areas for municipal police officers within Florida as municipalities located
in extremely rural areas were not included in this analysis.
Another limitation of the study is the lack of off-duty assignment information. Equity
theory explains that as police officer wages become stagnant or fall behind their regional
counterparts, officers will attempt to increase their salaries (Walster et al., 1978). It is logical to
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believe working more off-duty assignments is one way officers will attempt to respond to flat
police salaries (Burton, 1997) and the lacking of such a variable in this data set is a limitation.
Research has shown that most workers who moonlight away from their primary job do so as a
need to maintain their lifestyle (Smith Conway & Kimmel, 1998). Juris and Feuille (1973)
found the same is true for police officers moonlighting by working off-duty jobs; most are
working them as a result of the need for the money to maintain their lifestyle and rarely for
career advancement or other reasons.
A variable to capture off-duty work by police officers would be most valuable for an
individual level analysis; however an argument can be made that in an aggregate level study such
as this one, such a variable is of minimal value. Assuming officers are unable to coerce private
businesses into creating more off-duty jobs than they were already planning to offer, more
officers requesting to work off-duty jobs from a pool of a fixed supply of off-duty jobs will not
balance out the negative equity for salary overall. On an individual level, this will also
exasperate the pay inequity of officers who routinely relied on off-duty income but are given
fewer off-duty jobs from the fixed pool due to additional officers requesting off-duty work. For
example, if there are police off-duty jobs in a given city valued at $1 million annually and they
are typically worked by 200 officers, on average each of those officers could expect to earn an
extra $5,000 annually. If the following year officers’ salaries start to fall behind other regional
agencies and now 400 officers apply to work off-duty jobs, the $1 million of off-duty work is
split among more officers with the average participating officer now taking in only $2,500
annually from off-duty work. This is a net gain for officers newly participating in the off-duty
work pool, but simultaneously a net loss for the 200 officers who routinely earned $5,000 each in
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off-duty work in prior years. It is also a net equal proposition for an agency as a whole at the
aggregate level as $1 million came in the previous year from off-duty jobs and the same came in
for off-duty compensation for the current year.
Although most non-salary expenditures were accounted for in this study, such as take
home car program, partially subsidized life, health, and dental (including fully subsidized)
insurance, not all possible expenditures were included. Others were removed for high
multicollinearity including state or local retirement plan, DROP retirement program, fully
subsidized life and health insurance. It is possible that some other unaccounted for differences
between non-salaried compensation was influential in police officer’s decisions to quit their jobs
or lack of influence the number of discretionary arrests they made. An attempt was made to
collect data on police department budgets to act as an additional control variable; however no
state-wide data sets could be located with this specific information for all of the study years and
with all of the study agencies included. In order to collect the more than 1400 data points on
police budgets, personal communication with each study police agency would have been
required. Receiving the cooperation from even a majority of the study agencies to research and
respond with their historical budget information back to 2001 seemed an unlikely task to
accomplish in any reasonable amount of time. For this reason, the lack of the police agency
budget as a control variable is a limitation of this study.
Change perceptions, a psychological equity response option to falling wages as explained
by equity theory, cannot be measured as it was not captured in the longitudinal data sets
available for the investigated 2001-2011 time frame. An acceptable and available measure has
not been identified that would properly capture a change of perception outcome. This is a
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limitation of using historical data sets for which such a measure was not captured. In order for
this variable to have been included in this analysis, someone would have had to ask all or at least
a proper sampling of police officers, at all Florida municipal police agencies information
pertaining to perception of their employee-to-employer equity balance each year of the study
period. This information was not available and for that reason the present study focuses on the
two most common actual employee responses to reestablish an equitable relationship when
salaries fall behind those of nearby agencies.
While the use of UCR Part II arrests per officer as a dependent variable is useful to
operationalize officer work input, it has some limitations. Department culture and management
styles have been found to explain variation in officer arrest rates (Mastrofski et al., 1987; D. A.
Smith, 1984), however both variables are subjective and not available for this study’s 11 year
data set. One would expect an agency that follows a zero tolerance or “broken windows”
approach (Wilson & Kelling, 1982, p. 29), focusing on arrests for minor crimes, would yield a
positive influence on UCR Part II arrests. Unfortunately, this information was not available for
all 122 study agencies. However other discretionary arrest control variables were available.
Future Research
Procedural justice, an idea that has been extensively researched from a citizens’
perspective, could be studied from a police officers’ viewpoint in the area of compensation,
particularly with stagnant or falling officer salaries. As noted by Folger and Konovsky (1989, p.
128) , “…a key aspect of reward systems involves not only the what of rewards that equity
theory has emphasized, but also the how emphasized by work on procedural justice.” Testing of
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deonance theory, a person’s natural response to injustice, often with anger, retribution and
occasionally involving a response that could be categorized as a reflection of poor judgment
(Folger, 2001; Folger, Ganegoda, Rice, Taylor, & Wo, 2013), would be another valuable
contribution to the policing literature, particularly at agencies where salaries have been reduced.
This analysis was limited to municipal police agencies in Florida located within a MSA
or Micro. Testing equity theory in a similar manner among municipal police officers located in
MSAs and Micros in other states throughout the country, particularly in regions other than the
South, would be a significant continuation of this work. It may be reasonable to believe that the
attrition experienced at municipal police agencies with stagnant or falling salaries are likely to be
experienced a other police agencies in other states, barring significant differences in regional
policing. Testing the responses of State and Federal law enforcement officers to falling or
stagnant salaries would also add to the body of knowledge on this subject.
An expansion of this work would be to include data from the Florida sheriff’s offices, or
county level law enforcement agencies, in the analysis. In Florida, sheriff’s offices tend to be
full service police departments; however they are different from municipal police agencies in a
few significant ways. First, they are headed by an elected official (sheriff) who may be more
sensitive to officer/deputy salaries or perhaps tax conscious voters. Second, they tend to manage
a jail as well which may influence the perceptions of deputies assigned to law enforcement duties
to reframe their non-salaried compensation, possibly finding added value in their nonsupervisory assignments as working in the jail may be viewed as a less desirable alternative.
Finally, since these county level law enforcement agencies tend to have overlapping jurisdiction
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with local municipalities, law enforcement deputies may have more knowledge of pay inequities
simply as a product of more cross agency contact. Sheriff’s office data is available via the CJAP
and UCR for the same time period analyzed in this study, 2001-2011.
Future researchers should consider investigating other effects of increased attrition when
municipal police officer’s salaries fall behind the regional average. Whether or not these
additional, salary influenced losses of personnel effect police legitimacy, procedural justice
and/or police-community trust would be of great interest. If a relationship is found, the
information could be useful for municipalities that are suffering from tight budget restrictions.
Finally, there are many avenues that could not be explored due to time and resource
limitations that I hope others can build on. These include the following questions: How many
officers have accurate knowledge of regional, referent salaries? Does accurate or inaccurate
information influence officer attrition? The same question could be asked of decision makers
who decide on police officer salaries. Are they aware of the regional average pay for officers or
are they making decisions on police pay without consideration of the marketplace? Perhaps this
information could be collected via a questionnaire and compared to actual referent salaries to
determine if their knowledge or lack thereof, influences their decisions. When agencies
experience salary induced attrition, which officers tend to quit? What do they have in common?
Are they high quality, under performing or average officers? Does salary induced attrition harm
performance or quality measures at a police agency? The questions are many and hopefully this
study will influence other researchers to further explore the influence of officer salary inequity
on policing.
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APPENDIX A
GROUP BASED TRAJECTORY MODELING
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Group Based Trajectory Modeling

Group based trajectory modeling (TRAJ) was developed in the 1990’s for analysis of
developmental trajectory of behaviors by Nagin and Land (1993). Later Daniel Nagin (1999, p.
139) explained TRAJ with the following description:
A developmental trajectory describes the course of a behavior over age or time. A groupbased method for identifying distinctive groups of individual trajectories within the
population and for profiling the characteristics of group members is demonstrated. Such
clusters might include groups of "increasers." "decreasers," and "no changers." Suitably
defined probability distributions are used to handle 3 data types—count, binary, and
sychometric scale data. Four capabilities are demonstrated: (a) the capability to identify
rather than assume distinctive groups of trajectories, (b) the capability to estimate the
proportion of the population following each such trajectory group, (c) the capability to
relate group membership probability to individual characteristics and circumstances, and
(d) the capability to use the group membership probabilities for various other purposes
such as creating profiles of group members.
A careful analysis of the abc’s of Nagin’s (1999) TRAJ capabilities, demonstrate they do
not appear to be applicable or in demand for this analysis: (a) The focus of this analysis is not
about groups, but rather a test of 3 specific dependent variables, identified by theory, that
expected to change in a known direction when the independent variable changes (b) There is no
demand to estimate the proportion of the population following each group, because the response
to a change in the dependent variable in a given year is the focus of the analysis, not groups (c)
Group membership probabilities are not of importance here because groups, and more
specifically characteristics of groups are not the focus of this analysis (d) Creating profiles of
group members is not needed or necessary; the effects of a change in the dependent variable,
officer starting salary, regardless of how it can be grouped, is of importance.
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TRAJ may be best summarized as an, “…approach for identifying distinctive clusters of
individual trajectories within the population and for profiling the characteristics of individuals
within the clusters” (Nagin, 1999, p. 139). Profiling the characteristics of those agencies with
salaries that have fallen below regional averages over time is not the intent of this analysis; in
fact the characteristics of such agencies are not of particular interest for this analysis. Rather the
analysis is intended to test for several specific response behaviors or the dependent variables
identified in the literature. Arrests and attrition as predicted by equity theory, are thought to
immediately follow changes in the independent variable, agency starting salary, according to
equity theory. This analysis is about testing theory, rather than being an exploratory analysis
searching for common characteristics, as TRAJ is designed. In fact an agency that has a general
trajectory upwards in salary when compared to its regional counterparts, but has just two years of
decline in comparative salary, could potentially demonstrate the predicted change in the
dependent variables in the year during or immediately following the short term decline. Such a
response would add value to the analysis, strengthening the results, though with a TRAJ analysis
the agency likely would have been grouped in the “high” trajectory group with better salaries and
not with the “low” trajectory group.
The use of TRAJ typically coincides with the patterns or trajectories themselves
identified as the dependent variables. Some examples include (Griffiths & Chavez, 2004) where
a grouping of neighborhoods which experience unique, mid-range levels of patterned violence
distinctly different from the traditional low and high trajectory level violence neighborhoods,
was identified possibly for the first time. Groff, Weisburd, and Yang (2010) used eight
trajectory groups as the dependent variable and once identified and plotted, found they were not
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located spatially together. Stults (2010) identified homicide trajectory groups first and then
attempted to identify characteristics shared by members of the trajectory groups. In their work,
Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, and Yang (2004, p. 296) used TRAJ for, “…exploring the patterns of
change in Seattle data,” that led to the discovery that most street segments had stable crime
trajectories over 14 years and only a small percentage influenced the majority of overall crime
rate fluctuations. And in the work of Corsaro, Hunt, Hipple, and McGarrell (2012), TRAJ again
allowed for the creation of three crime trajectory groups, high, medium and low leading to three
distinct impacts of the study’s treatment on the three pre-established crime trajectory groups.
TRAJ is best used when one needs to, “…identify clusters of individuals with similar
developmental trajectories,” (Weisburd et al., 2004, p. 296); or when, “… identifying distinctive
groups of individual trajectories within the population and for profiling the characteristics of
group members” (Nagin, 1999, p. 139). TRAJ identifies trajectory groups first and then allows
for the researcher to identify shared characteristics of those groups. In this analysis, grouping is
not under study. Shared characteristics of any identified groups, beyond sharing the same or
similar change in the independent variable, are not of significant importance either. In fact, in
this analysis identifying trajectory groups first, as required by TRAJ is problematic. First
creating trajectory groups based on the three dependent variables will likely lead to the creation
of three sets of groups, though equity theory only requires change in a minimum of one of the
three dependent variables. Additionally the dependent variables can be influenced by a
multitude of unmeasured variables not captured by the existing data set. For example, poor
management could lead to higher attrition or a zero tolerance policing approach could lead to
higher UCR Part II arrests.
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Panel Data Analysis

The units of observation within this analysis are at the agency level, specifically agency
starting salary, agency UCR Part II arrests and agency attrition. The unit of analysis is also at the
agency level as seen in the research questions:
1. Does a municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional municipal
police agencies lead to increased attrition as measured by agency attrition?
2. Does a municipal police agency’s pay scale falling behind other regional municipal
police agencies lead to decreased work input as measured by UCR Part II arrests?
As the unit of analysis is the agency and the interest is what occurs to the agency, not the
individual officer, the cohort being followed is the observed agencies, not the observed
individual officers. In this analysis the units are “in themselves” the point of focus (Worrall &
Pratt, 2004b, p. 84). Year to year attrition and new hires each will slowly change the makeup of
the individuals within the units of analysis, but do not change the makeup of the observed cohort
group.
The 2001-2012 CJAP data set used for this analysis includes the population, rather than
just a sample, of Florida municipal police agencies, and includes repeated observations of all
Florida municipal police agencies for each year, excluding minimal missing data. Therefore this
data set follows a “true cohort” definition of a panel design rather than the “synthetic cohorts”
definition of a TSCS design as described by (Andreß et al., 2013, 1.1.1.2 Separating Age and
Cohort Effects," para. 2). More specifically the data with a large number of individual units N
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(300 Municipal Agencies) and observed annually over a short time period T (11 years, 20012011) meets Baltagi’s (2008, "1.1 Panel Data: Some Examples," para. 1) definition of a micro
panel. The inferences of interest in the analysis are specific to the observed unit of analysis,
Florida municipal police agency within an MSA, and the data can be best categorized as a TSCS
data. This calls for TSCS data analysis as opposed to a panel data analysis. It should be noted,
“Many of the same statistical techniques are used to model both TSCS and panel data” (Worrall
& Pratt, 2004a, p. 35).
Examples of the use of panel data analysis specify the use of the same cohort is observed
at multiple points. This can be seen in the work of Begley and Czajka (1993, p. 553) who
examined organization commitment on the effect of employee job satisfaction, intent to quit and
health:
Data collection took place at two points in time, 3 months apart. Of the 155 staff
and administrators, 102 returned completed questionnaires at Time 1, for a 66%
response rate, and 105 returned completed questionnaires at Time 2, for a 68%
response rate. Eighty-two respondents completed questionnaires at both times,
and this group constituted our sample.
There are two primary disadvantages to cross-section data over panel data, namely the
direction of causation is difficult to infer and there is significant risk of omitted variable bias that
is not significant with panel data (Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998, p. 2). Because panel data
follows the same cohorts, it allows for control of unknown characteristics that are constant over
time, and is essentially a pre-test post-test design (Andreß et al., 2013, "1.1.1.3 Controlling for
Omitted Variable Bias", para. 2)
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Florida Metropolitan Statistical Areas
Table 9
Florida Counties sorted by Metropolitan Statistical Area
Florida Metropolitan Statistical Areas
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent

Inclusive Counties
Escambia
Santa Rosa
Okaloosa
Walton
Bay
Gulf
Gadsden
Leon
Wakulla
Jefferson
Gilchrist
Alachua
Baker
Nassau
Duval
Clay
St. Johns
Marion
Volusia
Flagler
Lake
Seminole
Orange
Osceola
Brevard
Indian River
Hernando
Pasco
Pinellas
Hillsborough
Polk
Manatee
Sarasota
Charlotte

Crestview-Fort Walton Beach-Destin
Panama City
Tallahassee

Gainesville
Jacksonville

Ocala
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach
Orlando-Kissimmee

Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville
Vero Beach
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater

Lakeland
Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice
Punta Gorda

(table continues)
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Florida Metropolitan Statistical Areas
Cape Coral-Fort Myers
Naples-Marco Island
Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce

Inclusive Counties
Lee
Collier
St. Lucie
Martin
Palm Beach
Broward
Miami-Dade
Highlands
Citrus
Sumter

Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach

Sebring
Homosassa Springs
The Villages

The following Florida counties are not included within a Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA) nor a Micropolitan Statistical Area (Micro): Bradford, Calhoun, Columbia, DeSoto,
Dixie, Franklin, Glades, Hamilton, Hardee, Hendry, Holmes, Jackson, Lafayette, Levy, Liberty,
Madison, Monroe, Okeechobee, Putnam, Suwannee, Taylor, Union and Washington counties.
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Examples of Part II Arrests
The UCR handbook lists the following offenses as Part II (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
2004b, p. 8):
Other Assaults
Forgery and Counterfeiting
Fraud
Embezzlement
Stolen Property: Buying, Receiving, Possessing
Vandalism
Weapons: Carrying, Possessing, etc.
Prostitution and Commercialized Vice
Sex Offenses
Drug Abuse Violations
Gambling
Offenses Against the Family and Children
Driving Under the Influence
Liquor Laws
Drunkenness
Disorderly Conduct
Vagrancy
All Other Offenses
Suspicion
Curfew and Loitering Laws—(Persons under 18)
Runaways—(Persons under 18)
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